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THE EPA PROPOSAL: ADDING THE ELEMENT
OF CERTAINTY TO CERCLA LENDER
LIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, environmental waste issues have come to the
forefront of the government's and the public's attention.- Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 2 in an attempt to cleanup the
environment. CERCLA imposes cleanup liability on lenders.3
CERCLA lender liability may reach $50 million.4 CERCLA is an
attempt to organize and supplement the chaotic and ineffective hazardous substance cleanup laws.5 The underlying policy of CERCLA
1. Susan M. King, Lenders'Liabilityfor Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL L. 241,

249 (1988) (extending environmental liability to encompass lenders).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified, in part, as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)). Congress crafted CERCLA to empower the federal government with the necessary remedial power to cleanup
already existing hazardous waste sites. Patricia L. Quentel, Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutionsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under
CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 139, 141-42.
3. Quentel, supra note 2, at 145 (noting that the federal government asserts liability against lenders that extend credit to the owner and operator of a
hazardous waste site and later foreclose on the site).
4. Scott Wilsdon, Comment, When a Security Becomes a Liability. Claims
Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 1261, 1269
(1987). Responsible parties incur liability for all removal and remedial costs
plus interest charges. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1987). See irfra notes 23-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of remedial and removal costs. Removal costs
are the costs affiliated with minimizing pollution damage. § 9601(23). Remedial
costs are the costs necessary to permanently dispose of hazardous waste.
§ 9601(24). However, no statutory limit exists when the release, or threatened
release, of hazardous waste results from willful misconduct or the failure to
cooperate in a cleanup effort. Wilsdon, supra,at 1270. Additionally, responsible parties incur liability for damaging natural resources. § 9607(a)(4)(C)
(1987). This liability may reach $50 million. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1987).
Furthermore, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA") orders a responsible party to terminate its hazardous waste activity, a court may
order additional penalties for a violation of this abatement order. § 9607(a)-(b).
The court may order a penalty of either $25,000 per abatement order violation
or a fine of up to $25,000 per day for failing to comply with the abatement order.
Id. Thus, a responsible party's CERCLA liability can range from $25,000 to $50
million depending upon the degree of the damage and the extent of the party's
cooperation with the EPA. Id.
5. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET. AL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW

AND PoLIcY 568 (1984). CERCLA applies fundamentally to cleanup measures
and leaking, inactive, or abandoned waste sites. Id. It exists to provide an
emergency response to address hazardous waste spills. Id.
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places ultimate responsibility for hazardous waste cleanup upon
"generators, transporters, and past and present hazardous waste
site owners and operators."6 In furtherance of this policy, CERCLA includes expansive liability provisions with few affirmative
defenses. 7 In a series of recent decisions, courts have extended
CERCLA liability to lenders in addition to generators, transporters,
owners and operators. 8 As a result of this expansion, lenders with
mere contractual connections to hazardous waste sites are now vulnerable to liability.9
Congress enacted CERCLA to expand the protective environmental legislation concerning hazardous waste 0 beyond the regulatory and management authority granted in an earlier act.:" Under
6. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074,1081 (1st
Cir. 1986). CERCLA liability is placed upon the party that profited from the
manufacture or use of the hazardous substances. Note, Developments in the

Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1542 (1986).
7. Quentel, supra note 2, at 159 (listing of four broad groups of responsible
parties susceptible to CERCLA liability).
8. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1261 (extending CERCLA liability). See State
of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding current facility owner responsible for cleanup of previous owner's waste);
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
1003 (D.S.C. 1986)(finding sublessor liable for hazardous waste disposal caused
by sublessee); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,698, 20,698-99 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984) (stating company may be liable when
acting as "conduit" in transfer of CERCLA); United States v. Argent Corp., 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616, 20,617 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984) (holding lessor liable for lease disposal activities); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding vice president and
major shareholder liable for wastes disposed by corporation), qff'd in part,
rev'd in part,810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
9. Quentel, supra note 2, at 159 (expanding CERCLA liability to encompass lenders). See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556,
563 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (foreclosing lender can incur CERCLA liability). See infra
notes 60-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of lender liability cases.
10. This comment uses the terms "hazardous substance" and "hazardous
waste" to mean '"hazardoussubstance" as defined in CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (1987).
The term "hazardous substance" means:
...

(B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance... which

proposed.., when released into the environment may present substantial
danger to the public health or welfare or the environment (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under... the Solid Waste
Disposal Act ... (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 307(a) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed
under ... the Clean Air Act... (F) any imminently hazardous chemical
substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken
action.
Id. Additionally, the EPA is empowered to label a substance "hazardous" if the
substance "may present a substantial danger to the public health or welfare or
the environment." § 9602(a). See also Quentel, supra note 2, at 139 n.1.
11. The earlier environmental act was the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No.
94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
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CERCLA, the federal government has the remedial authority to
cleanup hazardous waste sites.-2 Because of the pressure to pass
CERCLA, Congress failed to produce CERCLA legislative history
and failed to resolve sensitive liability issues.' 3 Therefore, Con(1982)). RCRA is a regulatory statute governing the management of hazardous

waste from generation to disposal. King, supra note 1, at 243.
The purpose of RCRA is to eliminate future pollution by preventing the
development of additional hazardous waste sites. William L. Kovacs & John F.
Klucsik, The New FederalRole in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L 205, 206 (1977).
RCRA authorizes the EPA to regulate generators and transporters of hazardous waste as well as owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal ("TSD facilities"). King, supra note 1, at 245.
RCRA classifies "hazardous waste generation" as "the act or process of producing hazardous waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(6) (1987). Therefore, a generator includes "any person, whose act or process produces waste identified or listed as
hazardous or whose act first causes hazardous waste to become subject to regulation." §§ 6921(d), 6922. Any generator that produces more than one hundred
kilograms of hazardous waste per month must comply with the RCRA regulations. King, supra note 1, at 247. Additionally, under RCRA a generator is also
required to obtain a storage permit from the EPA to store hazardous waste for a
period greater than ninety days. Id.
RCRA also regulates transporters of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6923
(1987). A transporter is defined as "any person engaged in the offsite transportation of hazardous waste by air, rail, highway, or water." 40 C.F.R. § 260.10
(1991). A transporter is required to obtain a storage permit in order to store
hazardous waste for a period greater than ten days. 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (1987).
Additionally under RCRA, transporters must comply with extensive notice and
reporting requirements if a discharge of hazardous waste occurs during transportation. King, supra note 1, at 248.
In addition, RCRA governs owners and operators of TSD facilities. Id. A
person is an owner if he owns all or part of a facility. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1991).
A person is an operator if he is responsible for the overall operation of a facility.
Id. RCRA imposes detailed regulations upon owners and operators concerning:
(1) the compilation of records of all hazardous waste treated, stored or disposed;
(2) the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste in compliance with
the EPA's methods, techniques, and practices; (3) the location, design and construction of TSD facilities; (4) the implementation of plans to minimize unanticipated damage from hazardous waste; (5) the qualification standards for
ownership, operation, employee training, and security;, and (6) the compliance
with all permit requirements. King, supra note 1, at 248.
RCRA contains harsh penalties for failing to adhere to its regulations. Id.
Civil penalties shall not exceed $25,000 per day for compliance violations. 42
U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1987). Criminal sanctions include a maximum of two years
imprisonment or a $50,000 fine that may be imposed for intentional violations.
§ 6928(d). Additionally, RCRA authorizes both temporary and permanent injunctive relief to either compel compliance or close a business with repeated
violations. King, supra note 1, at 249. Further analysis of RCRA is beyond the
scope of this comment. For additional information, see Kovacs & Klucsik,
supra, at 205.
12. King, supra note 1, at 253 (giving remedial power granted by CERCLA
to the federal government).
13. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1263 n.17. In United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), the Missouri
court labelled CERCLA as "a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation,
marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions." For example, CERCLA
does not define whether liability is joint and several or whether a defendant has
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gress saddled the judiciary with the responsibility of shaping CERCLA's application. 14 As a consequence, the courts have
inconsistently applied CERCLA to lenders, holding them liable for
hazardous waste cleanup costs.1 5
This comment will examine proposals offered by Congress and
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") that attempt to define lender activity, protect a lender's security interest, and maintain CERCLA's remedial environmental purpose. Section II will
provide an overview of CERCLA's provisions and amendments.
a right to contribution. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1264 n.18. Senator Randolph,
the sponsor of CERCLA, stated:
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be
governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. An example is joint and several liability. Any reference to these terms has been
deleted, and the liability of joint tort-feasors will be determined under common or previous statutory law.
126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
The 96th Congress hastily approved CERCLA on December 11, 1980, in re-

action to the increasing environmental problem created by hazardous sites and
spills. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir.
1985). President Carter signed CERCLA into law (December 11, 1980), at the
"eleventh hour," just prior to the inauguration of the Reagan Administration.
Id.
A bipartisan committee of senators introduced the bill that became CERCLA and the Senate passed the bill in lieu of pending measures on the subject.
Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1980). On December 3, 1980, the House of Representatives considered and passed CERCLA after little "debate, under a suspension of the
rules, [and] in a situation which allowed for no amendments." Id. Additionally,
Congress failed to issue a report on the enacted CERCLA. Id. Therefore, the
courts are unable to utilize legislative history to interpret the terms of the statute. Wilsdon, supranote 4, at 1263 n.17.
CERCLA addresses the startling increase of hazardous waste in the United
States. Roslyn Tom, Interpretingthe Meaning of Lender ManagementParticipation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 925 (1989). As
of 1988, the United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") located as many
as 425,380 potential hazardous waste sites. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Jan. 22,
1988). The GAO estimated the cleanup costs would exceed $22 billion. Id. The
GAO report is contrasted by a 1984 projection that stated the cost of cleaning
the 1800 most threatening sites would require an expenditure of $23 billion.
EPA OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EXTENT OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE RELEASE PROBLEM AND FUTURE FUNDING NEEDS CERCLA 301
(A)(1)(C) STUDY, FINAL REPORT 1,1 (Dec. 1984). In 1984, the EPA estimated

that the average expenditure to cleanup a hazardous waste site was in excess of
$12 million. Amendment to National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan: The National Priorities List, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,320, 40,325 (1985). Additionally, in 1985, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
estimated that an expenditure of $100 billion would be required to clean the
10,000 existing hazardous waste sites and that the cleanup effort would require
50 years to accomplish. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
SUPERFUND STRATEGY 3 (1985).
14. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1264 n.18 (resolving CERCLA issues not resolved by Congress is a judiciary function).
15. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
inconsistent application of liability.

19921

Adding Certainty to CERCLA Lender Liability

Section HI will survey the court decisions that have addressed and
expanded CERCLA lender liability. Section IV will introduce
three proposals that attempt to define the scope of CERCLA lender
liability. Finally, section V will evaluate the recent EPA proposal
and discuss the feasibility of implementing this proposal.

II. THE HmsroPmcAL BACKGROUND OF CERCLA
CERCLA provides the authority for the government to cleanup
hazardous waste.16 As enacted by Congress, CERCLA enforcement
power belonged to the President.17 In 1981, President Reagan delegated this authority to the EPA.'8 Pursuant to CERCLA, the EPA

has two methods to accomplish hazardous waste cleanup. First, the
EPA may order the responsible parties to undertake the necessary

remedial cleanup measures, provided the responsible parties possess the capacity to perform this task.19 Alternatively, the EPA

may take immediate action to cleanup hazardous waste and subsequently sue the responsible parties for the cleanup 20 costs.21 CERCLA established a Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund
16. Quentel, supra note 2, at 149 (noting that CERCLA grants cleanup authority to government).
17. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1264 (CERCLA enforcement authority delegated to the President). 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1987) provides:
(a)(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a
substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act.., to
remove or arrange for the removal of... or take any other response measure ... which the President deems necessary to protect the public health
or welfare or the environment. When the President determines that such
action will be done properly and promptly by the owner or operator of the
facility... the President may allow such person to carry out the action.
Therefore, initially the President controlled CERCLA hazardous waste
cleanup enforcement authority. Id.
18. Exec. Order No. 12,286, 46 Fed. Reg. 9901 (1981) (delegating CERCLA
authority to EPA). Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(1) (1983) provides:
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is authorized
to promulgate rules and regulations specifying, with respect to ... (A) the
location, title, or condition of a facility, and (B) the identity, characteristics,
quantity, origin, or condition (including containerization and previous
treatment) of any hazardous substances contained or deposited in a facility.
19. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the delegation of CERCLA enforcement authority.
20. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1987), President Ronald Reagan delegated
his removal authority to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency. Exec. Order No. 12,286, 46 Fed. Reg. 9901 (1981). Wilsdon, supra note
4, at 1264 n.20.
21. In addition to the actual remedial costs, the EPA may recover "on-site
and off-site investigations of the hazardous condition, lab fees, engineer's fees,
consultant's fees, court costs, and charges for the time of government personnel." King, supra note 1, at 255 n.64.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 25:349

("Superfund") 22 to finance the removal 2s and remedial 24 response2 5
costs incurred during hazardous waste removal. Prior to expending
Superfund assets, the EPA must identify hazardous waste sites
across the United States and rank these sites on a National Priorities List ("NPL") according to the threat the sites pose to the public
and environment. 26 Next, the EPA must comply with the National
Contingency Plan ("NCP") that regulates hazardous waste
cleanup. 27
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (Superfund funding). 'There is established... a
trust fund to be known as the 'Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund' ...
consisting of such amounts as may be appropriated or transferred... as provided in this section." I&i. In 1980, $1.6 billion was appropriated to Superfund,
composed of 87.5% from taxes on crude oil, imported petroleum products, and
some hazardous chemicals and 12.5% from general revenue appropriations.
Quentel, supra note 2, at 149 n.43.
23. A removal action is a short term response undertaken to minimize the
pollution damage. Quentel, supra note 2, at 148 n.40. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1987)
provides:
"remove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary
taken in the event of: [1] the threat of release of hazardous substances into
the environment ... [2] to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material
... [3] to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or
welfare or to the environment.
24. A remedial action is a long range response action designed to be a permanent containment or disposal of the hazardous waste. State of New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)
(1987) provides: "'remedy' or 'remedial action' means those actions consistent
with permanent remedy ...so that the [hazardous substance does] not migrate
to cause substantial danger to present or future public health."
25. CERCLA defines response costs to include both removal and remedial
action costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1987).
26. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1265. To list a site on the National Priorities
List ("NPL"), the EPA must. (1) evaluate the site; (2) identify the type and
amount of the hazardous waste; (3) estimate the potential threat to the public
and the environment; and (4) record the most appropriate response. Quentel,
supra note 2, at 147 n.32. The evaluation consists of collecting information and
the records of the hazardous waste site, conducting an on-site inspection to sample the soil, air, and water surrounding the site, and placing the site in the appropriate NPL slot. Id
27. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1041. Congress established the National
Contingency Plan ("NCP") in 1968 to enable the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act"), to federally coordinate oil spill cleanup. Quentel,
supra note 2, at 149 n.42. The NCP outlines the discovery, investigation, and
response methods for hazardous waste cleanup. Id. Additionally, it is not a requirement for a company to be listed on the NPL to incur liability for response
costs. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1045-46. The Shore Court held that even
though the EPA is required to publish the NPL, "inclusion on the NPL is not a
requirement for the State to recover its response costs." Id. Therefore, it is
only necessary for a company to be listed on the NPL before the EPA can use
Superfund assets to cover response costs. Id. Obtaining NPL status is not a
prerequisite to CERCLA liability. Id.
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act ("SARA"). Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
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To establish a prima facie case of CERCLA liability and recover Superfund outlays, the EPA must establish four facts in addition to complying with the NCP.2 The EPA must establish that:
(1) the site is a "facility"; (2) a hazardous substance release occurred; (3) the EPA incurred response costs; and (4) the defendant
is the responsible party.29 The defendant's liability as a responsible
party is generally the only element at issue.3° Four groups of defendants are potentially liable for response costs under CERCLA:
(1) current owners and operators of waste facilities; (2) owners and
operators at the time of waste disposal; (3) generators of hazardous
waste; and (4) transporters of hazardous waste.31 Only after the
9675 (1987)). SARA increased the amount of Superfund and toughened NCP
standards. Quentel, supranote 2, at 148 n.43. SARA included provisions for an
additional $8.5 billion appropriation to Superfund. An Annotated Legislative
History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 16
ENVTL- L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,363, 10,363-64 (Dec. 1986). This increased
funding is the result of a $2.7 billion tax on imported and domestic petroleum
products, a $1.3 billion tax on chemical feedstocks and imported chemical derivatives, and a $2.5 billion "environmental tax" assessed to corporations with an
annual income in excess of $2 million. 17 Env'l Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 955 (Oct.
24, 1986). Additional funds were provided by $1.25 billion in general revenues,
$300 million in projected interest on the money in Superfund and $300 million
in projected recovery of costs at hazardous waste sites. Id. at 956. In addition,
SARA accelerated the use of Superfund money to cleanup hazardous waste,
expanded the EPA's power to reach responsible parties, and gave incentives for
private parties to become involved in cleanup activities. An Annotated Legisla.
tive History of the Superfund Amendments and ReauthorizationAct of 1986,
supra, at 10,363-64.
28. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,1379 (8th Cir.
1989) (requiring four elements to establish CERCLA liability).
29. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D.
Md. 1986). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1987):
To recover its response costs, the government must prove that. (1) the site
is a "facility"; (2) a release or threatened release of any hazardous substance from the site has occurred; (3) the release or threatened release has
caused the federal government to incur response costs; and (4) the defendant is one of the persons designated as a party liable for the costs.
CERCLA defines facility to include: "any building, structure, installation,
equipment, pipe, or pipeline ... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch,
landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or ... any
site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of,
or placed, or otherwise come to be located." § 9601(9).
The EPA has a poor record of recovering Superfund response expenditures. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENvRONNmNTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON EPA's COST RECOVERY AcTioNs AGAINST
POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTIEs 1, 1 (1986). As of 1985, the EPA appor-

tioned $1.3 billion of Superfund and had only successfully negotiated 84 cost
recoveries (totaling $14 million). Id. The cost to recovery ratio barely exceeds
one percent. Id.
30. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1265 (stating that the only element at issue
concerns whether defendant is a responsible party).
31. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 577 (four classes of liable
defendants under CERCLA).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1987) creates four classes of defendants liable under
CERCLA:
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EPA ranks the site on the NPL, complies with the NCP, and estab32
lishes the requisite facts may it recover Superfund response costs.
The EPA cannot recover Superfund expenditures if it fails to execute the above procedure33

However, CERCLA's provisions do not include an explicit standard of liability, nor is the act itself supported by any relevant legis(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility; (2) any person who at
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of; (3) any person
who by contact, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances .. .at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances; and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or site selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.
(emphasis added).
To perpetuate the goals of CERCLA, courts interpret the phrase "owner
and operator" to mean the person owning or operating the facility at the time
the EPA initiates a lawsuit. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550,
1554 (11th Cir. 1990), rehg denied,911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,111
S. Ct. 752 (1991). In order to incur CERCLA liability under § 9607(a)(1), it is
necessary for the defendant to be an owner or an operator of the facility. Id.
He does not need to be both the owner and operator of the facility. Id. Thus,
although the "owner and operator" language of § 9607(a)(1) is in the conjunctive, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Fleet Factorsconstrued the language in the disjunctive (owners or operators) pursuant to interpretations of
other federal decisions. 1d. See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 732
F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (interpreting § 9607(a)(1) in the disjunctive);
Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269,
1280 (D.Del 1987) (construing in the disjunctive), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.
1988); MarylandBank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 578 (interpreting statute in
disjunctive). The Fleet Factors Court "perceive[ld] no rational explanation,
other than careless statutory drafting, for imposing liability upon 'owners or
operators' under one section [§ 9607(a)(2)] but holding 'owners and operators'
liable under another section [§ 9607(a)(1)]." Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1554 n.3.
The Fleet Factors Court's disjunctive construction is further supported because
§ 9601(20)(A), CERCLA's definitional section, only uses the phrase "owner or
operator." Id. Thus, an owner or operator may incur CERCLA liability. Id.
In order to encounter CERCLA liability under § 9607(a)(3), the defendant
must do more than just sell a product that contains hazardous waste. Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,1317 (11th Cir. 1990).
Evidence must exist that the defendant's transaction included an arrangement
for the "disposal" of hazardous waste. 1d, However, it is not necessary for the
defendant to make specific decisions "as to how, when, and by whom a hazardous substance is to be disposed" to incur CERCLA liability. Id. at 1318. Defendants encounter CERCLA liability when they are the party responsible for
"arranging" for the disposal of the hazardous substance. Id. Therefore, upon
establishing all four facts against any of the four groups of defendants, the EPA
is entitled to replenish Superfund. Id. at 1317.
32. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1265 (recovery requirements for Superfund
outlays).
33. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1265 (no EPA recovery for failing to execute
the procedure).
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lative history. 34 Thus, the task of fashioning CERCLA's liability
policy fell to the courts.35 The courts interpreted CERCLA's provisions to impose strict liability?36 Some courts have gone beyond
strict liability and found CERCLA liability without requiring a
causal link between the defendant's acts and the creation of hazardous waste.3 7 Additionally, most judicial interpretations of CERCLA hold that the statute allows joint and several liability among
responsible parties?38 Therefore, each responsible party is poten34. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,

838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting that CERCLA contained neither a standard of
liability nor legislative history).
35. Prior to the enacted version, CERCLA contained provisions detailing
strict liability. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1267. The sparse legislative history
suggests that the strict liability provisions were removed as a last minute Congressional compromise in order to pass CERCLA. Quentel, supra note 2, at 153.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deleted provisions and the judicial development of CERCLA.
36. The following courts have interpreted CERCLA to impose strict liability. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md.
1986); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.

Inst.) 20,272,20,274 (D.S.C. Feb. 23,1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharm.

& Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 84344 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-43 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
Even though CERCLA did not define the standard of defendant liability, it
required liability to be construed as defined in the Clean Water Act. Wilsdon,
supra note 4, at 1267. Courts interpret the Clean Water Act to impose strict
liability. See United States v. Le Beouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d. 787,789 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981) (Clean Water Act imposes strict liability); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 982 (1st Cir. 1977), cert denied,
435 U.S. 941 (1978) (court imposed strict liability). In 1986, Congress tacitly
agreed to the strict liability standard by reauthorizing CERCLA, under SARA,
without objecting to the judicial imposition of strict liability. Wilsdon, supra
note 4, at 1267.
37. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir.
1985). The court in Shore Realty held that § 9607(a) imposes strict liability upon
the current owner of a facility for a release of hazardous substances without
regard to causation. 1d. The Shore Realty Court distinguished between the imposition of strict liability without allowing a causation defense and the imposition of strict liability which recognizes such a defense. See WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 79, at 517 (1971). The Shore Realty Court prohibited the use of the lack of causation as an affirmative defense.
Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. In addition, the court found support for its strict
liability holding in the statutory construction of CERCLA. Id. The Shore Realty Court reasoned that requiring causation as a prerequisite to § 9607(a) liability would make the affirmative defenses under § 9607(b) "superfluous" because
each affirmative defense carves out a defense based on causation. Id. Therefore, the court held, if CERCLA liability depended upon causation, "the current
owner of a site could avoid liability merely by having purchased the site after
the chemical dumping had ceased." Id. at 1045. Thus, pursuant to Shore Realty,
the current owner of real property containing hazardous materials is liable for
removal and remedial costs even if the owner did not own the site at the time of
the disposal nor cause the waste to be disposed. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1268.
38. Wilsdon, supranote 4, at 1270. "A liability is said to be joint and several
when the creditor may demand payment or sue one or more of the parties to
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tially liable for a site's entire cleanup cost, regardless of the extent
of its actual conduct. 39 A responsible party found jointly and severally liable is able to seek indemnification from other responsible
parties. 40 However, a responsible defendant's contribution remedy
is limited if the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in
an illegal dumping of a hazardous substance.4 1 Thus, the judiciary's
interpretation of CERCLA's provisions allows for the imposition of
42
both strict liability and joint and several liability.
Although courts construe CERCLA to impose strict liability,
three affirmative defenses exist to relieve otherwise responsible
parties of liability.43 A party will entirely escape liability if it can
such liability separately, or all of them together at his option." BLACK'S LAW
DIcrIoNARY 837 (6th ed. 1990). The creditor may pursue more than one party,
but he may not receive double compensation. Id. The following courts have
held that CERCLA allowed the imposition of joint and several liability: United
States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.Supp. 1064, 1083 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,199 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v.
A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (S.D. Ill.
1984); United States v.
Stringfellow, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20, 385 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984);
Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-43 (S.D. Fla.
1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272, 20,274 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984); United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
39. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811. In Chem-Dyne, the court reasoned that joint and several liability is "particularly appropriate" in cleanup
disputes. I&. Frequently wastes are mixed and the responsible parties disagree
over which party is liable for the more significant health hazard. Id. In ChemDyne, 289 parties were responsible for creating 608,000 pounds of hazardous
waste. Id.
40. Colorado v. ASCARO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484,1489 (D. Colo.1985) (court
allowed a party found jointly and severally liable to seek contribution from
other parties). Section 9107(e) (2) states "nothing... shall bar a cause of action
that an owner or operator or any other person subject to liability under this
section... by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any other person." 42
U.S.C. § 9107(e)(2) (1987). Some courts have interpreted § 9107(e)(2) as allowing contribution. See Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27,
31 (D. Mo. 1985) (court interpreted CERCLA to allow contribution); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,807 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (contribution allowed). Contribution applies when the court forces one party to take
responsibility and the liable party sues other responsible parties to recover a
portion of the cleanup costs. Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
596 F. Supp. 283, 288-89 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In 1986, under SARA, Congress codified a responsible party's right to seek contribution. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1987).
41. United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 910-11 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (contribution not allowed for knowingly and willfully dumping hazardous waste).
42. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1270 (courts enforcing CERCLA impose both
strict and joint and several liability).
43. Quentel, supra note 2, at 156 (CERCLA affirmative defenses). 42 U.S.C.
§ 9107(b) (1987) states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages
resulting therefrom were caused solely by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of
war, (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
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demonstrate that the release of a hazardous substance was caused
by an act of God, a war, or a noncontractually related third party.44
CERCLA defendants most frequently attempt to escape liability by
using the third party affirmative defense rather than the act of God
46
or war defenses. 45 However, courts seldom accept this defense.
To successfully claim the third party defense, a defendant must
prove that: (1) no contractual relationship existed with the third
party;,and (2) the defendant exercised due diligence toward the hazardous substance and took precautions against acts or omissions of
the third party.47 Defendants usually fail to persuade the court that
they exercised due diligence related to the existing hazardous waste
and, thus, fail to escape CERCLA liability.48
In addition to the affirmative defenses, CERCLA contains a seof the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection

with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that- (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; (4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
44. Quentel, supra note 2, at 157 (three types of CERCLA affirmative
defenses).
45. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
Many CERCLA defendants claim protection under the third party affirmative
defense. Id- In GeneralElectric,the court found the General Electric Company
liable under CERCLA. I& General Electric sold oil to a dragstrip owner for
the purposes of dust control. Id. Liability attached pursuant to § 9607(a)(3) because General Electric had "by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal... of hazardous substances." Id. General Electric's use of the third
party defense failed to persuade the court. Id.
46. 1& (courts rarely grant relief under third party defense).
47. Quentel, supranote 2, at 157. The third party defense bars a generator
of hazardous waste from avoiding CERCLA liability by contracting with another to dispose or transport the hazardous waste. Id. In 1986, SARA broadened CERCLA's third party affirmative defense by creating an "innocent
landowner" definition under the term "contractual relationship" in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3) (1987). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(1987) Regarding land contracts,
SARA allowed a defendant to escape CERCLA liability by showing that its land
acquisition occurred after the hazardous waste disposal and that the defendant
had no reason to know the land contained hazardous waste. I& To avoid CERCLA liability, the defendant must establish the following by a preponderance of
the evidence: (1) the defendant acquired the land subsequent to the hazardous
waste disposal; (2) the defendant inquired regarding the prior uses of the property; and (3) the defendant did not know or did not have a reason to know about
the presence of a hazardous substance on the land. Tom, supra note 13, at 927.
To determine the defendant's innocence, courts consider the defendant's
knowledge, experience, ability to detect the contamination by inspection, and
the community knowledge of the property. Id. at 958.
48. Tom, supra note 13, at 927 (defendants third party defense claim fails
for lack of due diligence).
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curity interest 49 liability exemptionW° The security interest exemption excuses a creditor who retains ownership rights in a hazardous
waste site from liability, in an attempt to protect its security interest. 51 Targeted lenders frequently allege the security interest exemption. 52 However, this exemption penalizes a creditor that
participates in the management of the site.53 Yet, Congress did not
define the parameters of lender activity which constitutes imperinissible "participation in the management" of a site.M Thus, the
courts must determine the type of lender activity that constitutes
management and, therefore, triggers CERCLA liability."s
Lenders maintain that CERCLA's security interest exemption
language totally insulates them from liability. 56 To date, the courts
have failed to develop a precise standard of CERCLA lender liability.5 7 Recent judicial decisions expanded CERCLA liability to encompass lenders with less involvement in borrower management.-s
Thus, the level of involvement a lender may safely sustain without
experiencing CERCLA liability remains unsettled. 59
49. A security interest is defined as "a form of an interest in property which

provides that the property may be sold on default in order to satisfy the obligation for which the security interest is given." BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARY 1357
(6th ed. 1990).
50. Section 9601(20)(A) states, "[the] term [owner or operator] does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1987).
51. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994,
20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (no CERCLA liability for involvement restricted
to security interest protection).
52. Tom, supra note 13, at 927 (lenders defending CERCLA liability commonly claim the security interest exemption).
53. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996 (security interest not available to a
lender that participates in facility management).
54. Margaret Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund"and OtherEnvironmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAw
1133, 1142 (1986) (Congress failed to enumerate impermissible lender management participation).
55. Tom, supra note 13, at 927 (courts determine the level of participation
that constitutes management and security interest protection).
56. Murphy, supra note 54, at 1138-45 (1986). See supra note 9 and cases
cited therein for examples of lenders' claims under the security interest
exemption.
57. Tom, supra note 13, at 927 (courts have not set standards for CERCLA
lender liability).
58. Quentel, supra note 2, at 160 (courts expand CERCLA lender liability).
59. Tom, supra note 13, at 927. The difference between a broad and a narrow judicial interpretation of lender "participation in the management" within
the security interest exemption correlates to different external behavior for
lenders. Id. at 928. A narrow judicial interpretation will encourage lenders to
monitor waste sites. Id. A narrow interpretation benefits both banks and the
public because the banks, less afraid of CERCLA liability, are more willing to
negotiate workouts to recover loans and prevent small waste problems from
causing more damage to the environment. Id. Conversely, a broad interpretation of "participation in the management" will discourage banks from loaning
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III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF LENDER LIABILITY

Historically, courts have failed to consistently resolve CERCLA lender liability questions. An examination of the various judicial interpretations of lender liability is necessary to understand the
present status of CERCLA's security interest exemption. The financial structure of the transaction in each case is not the issue.
The critical factor is the activity of the lender. The present judicial
interpretation of CERCLA's security interest exemption evolved
from the following five principal cases.
The first case to consider lender liability for CERCLA cleanup
costs was In re TP.Long Chemica Inc.6° In Long, the EPA sought
to recover response costs from a bankrupt estate 61 and BancOhio
National Bank, a secured creditor of that estate.6 2 BancOhio held a
perfected security interest3 in the accounts receivable, equipment,
inventory and personal property of the debtor. 64 The bankruptcy
trustee6 5 auctioned all the personal property in the debtor's estate
except ninety drums of hazardous waste buried at the rear of the
property. 66 Since the unencumbered assets of the bankrupt estate
were insufficient to pay the response costs, the EPA sought to remoney. Id. A broad interpretation frustrates CERCLA's environmental purpose by depriving waste site owners access to the capital necessary to remedy
the environment. Id.
60. In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(first case to consider CERCLA lender liability). In Long, the T.P. Long Chemical Company ("debtor") operated a rubber recycling plant. Long, 45 Bankr. at
280.
61. A bankrupt estate "is comprised of all the legal and equitable interests
in property of debtors as of filing of bankruptcy petition." BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 147 (6th ed. 1990).
62. Long, 45 Bankr. at 281. Mr. T.P. Long owned the corporate stock of the
debtor. Id. at 280. The debtor filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Cede and the court ordered the debtor into Chapter 7 proceeding of
the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
63. A perfected security interest is "the process whereby a security interest
is protected, as far as the law permits, against competing claims to the collateral, which usually requires the secured party to give public notice of the interest as by filing in a government office." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (6th ed.
1990).
64. Long, 45 Bankr. at 280 (BancOhio held perfected security interest).
65. A bankruptcy trustee is a "[p]erson appointed by [the] Bankruptcy
Court to take charge of [the] debtor estate, to collect assets, to bring suit on
debtor's claims, to defend actions against it, and otherwise administer debtor's
estate." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 147 (6th ed. 1990).
66. In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278,280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
Only Mr. Long, the property owner, knew of the existence of the drums. Id. at
281. BancOhio's perfected security interest included the drums. Id. The EPA
discovered that the drums contained hazardous substances and warranted immediate cleanup activity. Id. The EPA requested that the bankruptcy trustee
undertake remedial cleanup action. Id. However, the trustee refused. Id.
Therefore, the EPA initiated cleanup activities at the T.P. Long Chemical site.
Id.
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67
cover the Superfund cleanup expenditures from BancOhio.

The Long Court held that BancOhio was not liable under CERCLA as an "owner or operator" of the hazardous facility.ss Rather,
BancOhio repossessed the collateral.69 The court reasoned that repossession of collateral property is a logical action taken by a lender
to protect its financial stake when a borrower defaults. 70 Therefore, the security interest exemption applied because "[t]he only
possible indicia of ownership that can be attributed to BancOhio is
that which is primarily to protect its security interest." 71 Thus, the
Long Court determined that repossession did not constitute "participation in management" under the security interest exemption. 72
However, it did not determine whether a lender's repossession triggered liability as an "owner or operator" under CERCLA. 73
In the next lender liability case, UnitedStates v. Mirabile,74 the
district court addressed the two untouched issues in Long.75 The
Mirabile Court considered: (1) whether a lender that forecloses on,
and takes title to, its mortgaged property is an "owner or operator"
for purposes of CERCLA liability;76 and, (2) under what circumstances a lender incurs CERCLA liability stemming from involve67. Id at 287. The EPA encountered $37,859.35 in CERCLA response costs.

Id.
68. Idc. at 288. The Long Court stated in dictum, that "even if BancOhio
repossessed its collateral [the drums] ... it would not be an 'owner or operator'
as defined under CERCLA." Id. BancOhio did not foreclose on its perfected
security interest Id. However, foreclosure would not have led to BancOhio's
CERCLA liability because the loan was secured by the debtor's personal property and not the real property where the wastes were buried. Wilsdon, supra
note 4, at 1275. Therefore, the drums, BancObio's personal prcperty, did not
constitute a facility. Id. CERCLA imposes liability for the owner or operator of
a facility. Id.
69. Id. at 288 (bank repossessed security).
70. Id- (foreclosure is a logical lender action to protect security interest).
71. Id at 289. Considering only the participation in the management of the
T.P. Long Chemical site, the court found BancOhio's involvement insufficient
to trigger CERCLA liability. Id. at 288.
72. Id. (foreclosure did not draw CERCLA liability).
73. Id. (narrow CERCLA issue addressed by court).
74. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
75. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,994 (court addressed open issues from
Long).
76. Courts, addressing lender liability under CERCLA, approach the issue
from one of two angles. First, a court may consider whether the lender is an
"owner or operator" subject to CERCLA liability. See supranote 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four parties liable for CERCLA cleanup
costs. Second, a court may consider whether the lender's actions constitute participation in the management of the facility or whether the lender remained
exempt because it was only protecting its security interest. See supra notes 4959 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's security interest exemption from liability.
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ment in its borrower's hazardous waste activities. 77 In Mirabile,the
court determined that a lender who forecloses and acquires title to
78
secured property is not an "owner or operator" under CERCLA.
77. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. Mirabile involved an EPA cost
recovery action against the current site owners. Id. In order to remove 550

drums of hazardous waste from the Mirabile's property, the EPA spent
$249,792.52. Id. The Mirabile property formerly housed a paint manufacturing
business. Id. During the 1970's, Arthur C. Mangels Industries, Inc.

('Mangels") owned and operated the paint manufacturing facility. Id. Turco

Coatings, Inc. ("Turco") later purchased Mangels Industries. Id. Mangels' and
Turco's paint manufacturing process produced the hazardous waste discovered
by the EPA. Id. Prompted by Turco's Chapter 11 petition, the Mirabiles obtained the property pursuant to a foreclosure action. Id. Since two banks
loaned money to the prior owners, the Mirabiles joined both the American
Bank and Trust Company ("American Bank") and Mellon Bank National Association ('Mellon Bank"). Id. The Mirabile Court examined whether either the
American Bank or Mellon Bank incurred CERCLA lender liability.
American Bank loaned Mangels money that was secured by a mortgage on
the paint manufacturing site. Id. at 20,996. Reacting to Turco's bankruptcy petition, American Bank began a foreclosure action. Id. Since American Bank
pledged the highest bid at the sheriff's sale, it obtained title to the property. Id.
Prior to assigning the property to the Mirabiles, American Bank visited the
property several times in an attempt to sell it to perspective purchasers. Id. All
of American Bank's site visits took place after Turco's paint manufacturing terminated. Id. American Bank assigned the property to the Mirabiles within
four months of obtaining title at the foreclosure sale. Id.
In addition, Mellon Bank was closely involved in the activities at the site.
Id. Mellon Bank loaned Turco money secured by Turco's inventory and assets.
Id. Mellon Bank became involved in Turco's operations once Turco encountered financial difficulties. Id. Mellon Bank placed one loan officer on Turco's
Advisory Board which was created to oversee operations. Id. Mellon Bank assigned a second loan officer to monitor Turco's financial health. Id. Mellon
Bank's involvement with Turco increased to include weekly site visits and advice to Turco on manufacturing, personnel and sales issues. Id. Mellon Bank
acquired Turco's inventory once Turco ceased manufacturing. Id.
Even though American Bank foreclosed on the property, it denied CERCLA liability and moved for summary judgment. Id. at 20,995. American Bank
presented two arguments to support this summary judgment motion. Id. First,
American Bank asserted that it was not a CERCLA owner because it lacked
legal title to the property. Id. at 20,996. Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, foreclosure only grants equitable, not legal, title. Id. Equitable title is the beneficial
interest of one person that equity regards as the real owner, although legal title
is vested in another. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1486 (6th ed. 1990). Legal title

is complete and perfect title regarding ownership and possession. Id. Second,
American Bank contended that the act of foreclosure is a step taken to protect a
security interest and, therefore, exempt under CERCLA. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L.
Rep. at 20,996. The Mirabile Court held that "actions with respect to foreclosure were plainly undertaken ...to protect [the bank's] security interest." Id.
The court determined that the CERCLA security interest exemption applied
regardless of whether the defendant held legal or equitable title acquired from
a foreclosure. Id. The court stated, "before a secured creditor such as [American Bank] may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, 'participatein the day-today operationalaspects of the site."' Id. at 20,995 (emphasis added). Financial
involvement is not sufficient to justify liability. Id. The Mirabile Court found
that foreclosure constituted a "prudent" and "routine" act towards the protection of a security interest. Id. at 20,996.
78. Id.(foreclosing lender not a CERCLA owner or operator).
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However, this conclusion was subject to two limitations. First,
the lender must restrict foreclosure actions to those designed to
protect its security interest.79 Second, the lender must avoid becoming "overly entangled" in the borrower's waste production.8 0 In
Mirabile, the lender's involvement with the borrower exceeded a
simple foreclosure action.81 However, the Mirabile Court determined that a further factual investigation was necessary prior to
imposing CERCLA liability.8 2 Therefore, pursuant to Mirabile, a
foreclosing lender absolutely avoids CERCLA liability, whereas a
lender that continues its involvement with a facility could incur
CERCLA liability.8 3 Unfortunately, the MirabileCourt dodged the
judicial opportunity to define the amount of lender involvement
necessary to trigger CERCLA.84 After Mirabile,the circumstances
of continued involvement that lead to lender liability remain
uncertain.8 5

Contrary to Mirabile, United States v. MarylandBank & Trust

Company88 held that a secured lender who obtains title to property,
pursuant to a foreclosure sale, is not protected under the security
interest exemption.87 In MarylandBank, the lender refused to remove the hazardous waste present on its secured property.s8 The
EPA removed the waste and sued Maryland Bank to recover the
response costs.8 9 Maryland Bank moved for summary judgment
79. Id. The court failed to express which foreclosure actions might trigger
CERCLA liability. Id. However, the court suggested that a lender may incur
liability by allowing waste producing operations to continue. Id.
80. Id. Regardless of whether a loan is secured by real or personal property, the security interest exemption offers the lender no protection when the
lender participates in the borrower's management. Id.
81. Id. See supra note 77 and accompanying text discussing Mellon Bank's
activities with Turco.
82. Id at 20,998. Concerning American Bank, the Mirabile Court distinguished between the participation in the day-to-day management and those acts
designed to protect a security interest. Id. at 20,996. However, given an application opportunity, the Mirabile Court refused to determine whether Mellon
Bank participated in the Turco management or whether the acts were designed
to protect a security interest. Id. Mellon Bank negotiated a settlement with the
EPA prior to the trial. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1279.
83. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,998 (lender avoids CERCLA liability if
involvement with the borrower is minimal after foreclosure).
84. Id. at 20,996 (court declined to decide Mellon Bank's liability).
85. Wilsdon, supra note 4, at 1279 (lender liability after Mirabile remains
undefined).
86. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986).
87. Id. at 579-80 (foreclosing lender incurred CERCLA liability).
88. Id. at 575 (Maryland Bank refused to cleanup waste).
89. Id. Up until 1980, Mr. and Mrs. Herschel McLeod, Sr. owned property
that contained a trash and garbage business. Id. Maryland Bank provided operating capital to the McLeods. Id. In 1980, Maryland Bank loaned Mark McLeod $335,000 to purchase the McLeod property. Id. Prompted by Mark's
failure to maintain payments, Maryland Bank purchased the property for
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under the security interest exemption. 90 However, the Maryland
Bank Court found the bank was not entitled to use the security interest exemption because its security interest terminated at the
foreclosure sale and "ripened" into a full title.9 1 The Maryland
Bank Court neglected to consider the lender's participation in the
borrower's management but instead focused on the lender's possession of the property subsequent to foreclosure.9 2 The court concluded that, at the time of cleanup, Maryland Bank was the owner
of the property and liable under CERCLA for the EPA's response
costs. 93 Thus, the MarylandBank Court held that the security interest exemption does not apply to a lender currently holding title
to property after a purchase at a foreclosure sale.94
$381,500 at a foreclosure sale. Id. Maryland Bank maintained ownership until
trial four years later. Id. Over a year after the foreclosure sale, the EPA discovered hazardous waste on the property. Id. The EPA requested Maryland Bank
to remove the hazardous waste, but the bank failed to comply. Id. The EPA
responded and removed 237 drums of hazardous waste and 1180 tons of polluted
soil, incurring a cost of $551,713.50. Id. at 575-76. Since Maryland Bank refused
to pay the EPA, the EPA initiated this action to recover the response costs. Id.
at 576.
90. Id. at 579. Maryland Bank made two other arguments to support its
motion. Id. at 576-78. First, Maryland Bank alleged that current owners of hazardous waste sites only incur CERCLA liability if they also operate the site. Id.
at 577. In spite of the conjunctive nature of "owner and operator" in
§ 9607(a)(1), the Maryland Bank Court interpreted the phrase to mean owner
or operator. Id. at 577. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conjunctive versus disjunctive interpretation of CERCLA liability
under § 9607(a)(1). Second, Maryland Bank attempted to use a third party affirmative defense to avoid CERCLA liability. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at
581. The MarylandBank Court remanded this issue for a further factual finding. Id.
91. Id. at 579. In Maryland Bank, the court found that the bank purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale to protect an investment, not a security
interest. Id. The indicia of ownership of a security interest exists only as long
as the mortgage continues. Id. Upon the foreclosure purchase, the mortgage
and the security interest terminated. Id.
However, the Maryland Bank Court found that the security interest exemption only protected lenders that held the indicia of ownership to protect the
security interest at the time of the cleanup. Id. The Maryland Bank Court
stated "the verb tense of the exclusionary language is critical." Id. The security
interest exemption uses the present tense of the verb to "1hold" stating that
liability does not include a person "who ... holds indicia of ownership primarily

to protect his security interest." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1987). The person attempting to use the exemption must possess only the security interest at the
time of cleanup. MarylandBank, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
92. Id. (court focused only upon lender's possession of security after
foreclosure).
93. Id. (Maryland Bank liable because it owned the property at the time of
cleanup).
94. Id. The fact that Maryland Bank held title to the property pursuant to
the foreclosure sale for four years heavily swayed the Maryland Bank Court's
holding. The Maryland Bank Court stated, "[b]ecause [Maryland Bank] has
held the property for such an extended period of time, [we] need not consider
... whether a secured party which purchased the property at a foreclosure sale
and then promptly resold it would be precluded from asserting the ... exemp-
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After the MarylandBank and Mirabile decisions, CERCLA liability status for foreclosing lenders appeared uncertain. The judicial decisions indicated that lenders holding polluted property for
four months (Mirabile) escaped liability, 95 while lenders holding
the property for four years (Maryland Bank) incurred liability.96
Neither the Mirabilenor the MarylandBank Courts offered a solution for a lender holding polluted property longer than four months
but less than four years. However, this unresolved issue was overshadowed by later decisions.
After MarylandBank, the emphasis of judicial CERCLA liability analysis shifted from an examination of a lender's foreclosure of
secured assets to an examination of a lender's level of participation
in the management of the borrower's facility.97 In United States v.
FleetFactorsCorp.,98 the United States attempted to place responsibility9 for EPA response costs13-° at the Swainsboro Print Works
tion." Id. at 579 n.5. Therefore, because of the disparity between the lenders'
ownership periods pursuant to the foreclosure, [four years in Maryland Bank
and four months in Mirabile] the Maryland Bank Court spurned overruling
Mirabile. Id. The court refused to apply the Mirabile holding to a period of
lender ownership beyond four months. Id. The MarylandBank Court further
reasoned that allowing foreclosing lenders to escape CERCLA liability grants
lenders an unfair advantage upon the resale of the EPA cleansed property. Id.
The Maryland Bank Court's reasoning assumes two things. Id. First, it assumes that the lender acquires the property cheaply at the foreclosure sale. Id.
Second, it assumes the bank is able to sell the property for a greater amount
after the taxpayer funded EPA cleanup effort rids the land of p.9lution. Id.
95. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Env. L. Inst.) :0,994, 20,996
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (foreclosing lender holding title for four months escapes
CERCLA liability).
96. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80
(D. Md. 1986) (court imposes CERCLA liability upon foreclosing lender possessing title for four years).
97. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990)
(CERCLA lender liability depends upon lender's participation in management),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
98. Id. at 1550.
99. Id. at 1552. In 1976, pursuant to a factoring agreement, Fleet Factors
agreed to advance funds to Swainsboro Print Works ("SPW") in return for the
assignment of SPW's accounts receivables. Id. A factoring agreement is the
sale of a company's accounts receivable at a discounted price to a purchaser that
assumes the risk of loss of the receivables. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 592 (6th
ed. 1990). The collateral for Fleet Factors' advances was a security interest in
SPW's textile facility, equipment, inventory and fixtures. Fleet Factors, 901
F.2d at 1552. Even after SPW filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1979, the court
allowed the factoring agreement between Fleet Factors and SPW tr continue.
Id. Fleet Factors stopped funding SPW in 1981 because SPW's debt exceeded
the value of SPW's accounts receivable. Id. In 1982, Fleet Factors foreclosed its
security interest in a portion of SPW's equipment and inventory and hired Baldwin Industrial Liquidators to auction the remainder of the collateral. Id. For
the collateral items that Baldwin was not able to sell, Fleet Factors contracted
with Nix Rogers. Id. at 1559. It allowed Rogers to take the equipment as long
as he cleaned the premises. Id. Prompted by SPW's failure to pay state and
county taxes, Emanuel County, Georgia, purchased the facility at a foreclosure
sale on July 7, 1987. Id.
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("SPW") on the lender, Fleet Factors. The United States alleged
that Fleet Factors was either a present "owner and operator" of the
facility' 0 1 or the "owner and operator" of the facility at the time of
disposal.' 0 2 Fleet Factors moved for summary judgment, contending that its participation in SPW management was not sufficient to
103
incur CERCLA liability.
The Fleet Factors Court rejected the Mirabile decision.' 04 Instead, the court formulated an interpretation of CERCLA liability
that imposed liability on a lender when it "participat[ed] in the financial management of [a] facility to a degree indicating [its] capac05
ity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous waste."'
100. Id, at 1553. In 1984, the EPA inspected the SPW facility and discovered
700 drums that contained hazardous chemicals and 44 truckloads of asbestos
waste. Id. The EPA response costs totalled $400,000. Id. The EPA sued Fleet
Factors to recover the cleanup response costs. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)(1)(1987). The Fleet Factors Court interpreted the

conjunctive phrase "present owner and operator" as a disjunctive phrase
("owner or operator"). FleetFactors,901 F.2d at 1554. It held that Fleet Factors
could incur liability as either a present owner or present operator of the facility.
Id. (emphasis added). The EPA filed suit against Fleet Factors on July 9, 1987.
Id. at 1555. Emanuel County, Georgia, owned the SPW facility on July 9, 1987.

Id. The FleetFactorsCourt found that a state or local government that involun-

tarily acquires title to a facility is not liable as an owner of the facility under
CERCLA. Id. Instead, CERCLA provides that an owner or operator is "any
person who owned or operated or otherwise controlled activities at the facility
immediately beforehand." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1987). The Fleet Factors
Court interpreted the phrase "immediately beforehand" as "without intervening ownership, operation and control." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555. Since
Fleet Factors had no involvement with SPW after 1983, the Fleet FactorsCourt
held Fleet Factors neither owned, operated or controlled SPW "immediately
before" Emanuel County's acquisition. Id. Therefore, the Fleet Factors Court
found that Fleet Factors was not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)(1). Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)(2)(1987). CERCLA imposes liability on "any person
who at the time of the disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated
any ... facility [where any] ... hazardous substances were disposed of." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(a)(2)(1987).
103. FleetFactors,901 F.2d at 1556 (Fleet Factors contends management participation was not sufficient to draw CERCLA liability).
104. In Mirabile, the court held that the type of lender participation that
draws CERCLA liability is participation in managerial, production or waste disposal activities. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,994,20,995 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,1985). At a minimum, a lender must participate
in the day-to-day operational aspects of a facility to encounter CERCLA liability. Id. at 20,996. The Mirabile Court held that financial participation failed to
induce CERCLA liability. Id. However, the Fleet Factors Court found the
Mirabilestatutory construction "too permissive toward secured creditors who
are involved in toxic waste facilities." Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557. The Fleet
FactorsCourt specifically rejected the interpretation of the secured creditor exemption adopted by Mirabile. Id. at 1558.
105. Id- at 1557. A lender will incur CERCLA liability if the lender's involvement with the management of the facility is deep enough to support the
inference that the lender could affect waste disposal decisions. Id. at 1558. The
Fleet FactorsCourt held that a lender's capacity to influence a borrower's treatment of hazardous substances shall be inferred from the extent of the lender's
financial involvement. Id. at 1559 n.13. Fleet Factor's involvement with SPW
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However, the Fleet Factors Court failed to enumerate the parame1° 6
ters of a lender's capacity to influence a corporation's policies.
Therefore, lenders lacked guidelines to define the extent of participation necessary to incur CERCLA liability.
The Fleet FactorsCourt justified its expansive interpretation of
lender liability as consistent with the "overwhelming remedial"
goal of CERCLA.10 7 Furthermore, the Fleet Factors Court found
108
that its holding gave lenders latitude in dealing with borrowers.
The court's holding advocates a lender's monitoring of the debtor's
business and its participation in "occasional" and "discrete" financial decisions concerned with the protection of its security interincreased significantly once SPW terminated operations. Id. at 1559. Fleet Factor's set SPW's price for excess inventory, compelled SPW to receive approval
prior to delivering goods to customers, controlled which customers received finished goods, decided which employees to lay off, supervised the facility office
administrator, processed the employee tax forms, and contracted with Baldwin
to dispose of SPW's equipment and fixtures. Id. The court found that Fleet
Factors actively asserted control over the disposal of the hazardous waste at the
facility by forbidding SPW from selling chemically filled drums to buyers. Id.
Thus, inferring Fleet Factor's capacity to influence SPW's waste was not necessary. Id.
Fleet Factorsis unlike any previous environmental case. Weiner, Environmental LiabilityExpandedfor Lenders and Other Businesses, HoPKINs & SurTEE, July 1990, at 1. FleetFactorsis a decision about power and authority rather
than conduct. The lender does not have to become involved in a borrower's
operation to become liable for the environmental conditions caused by the borrower. Id. The lender must merely have the ability, power or authority to do
so. Id. The Fleet Factors Court did not define "capacity to influence." Fleet
Factors,901 F.2d at 1557. To incur CERCLA liability, a lender does not need to
reach the extreme of participating in the day-to-day operations. Id. Even
though participation in the day-to-day operations in not necessary to encounter
CERCLA liability, participation to that degree will certainly lead to CERCLA
liability. Id. Additionally, it is not necessary for the lender to expressly participate in facility management decisions concerning hazardous waste. Id. at 1559.
One glimmer of hope for lenders remains in the fact that this decision is binding
authority only in the Eleventh Circuit, which consists of the federal courts in
Alabama, Georgia and Florida. O'Brien, Fleet FactorsDecision Suggests Lower
Threshold for Liability; Will Have Impact on Secured Lending, 55 BNA's
BANKING REP. 104, 106 (1990). Additionally, practical circumstances could also
affect the strength of the holding. Id. at 106. Fleet Factorswas decided by a
quorum instead of the full appellate court panel. Id. When the case was pending, one of the regular appellate judges died and did not participate in the decision. Id. Of the two remaining judges, one judge was a senior district court
judge sitting by designation. Id. Therefore, of the three judges who heard the
Fleet Factors oral argument, only one judge participating in the holding was a
regular appeals court judge. Id.
106. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557 (actions that constitute capacity to influence waste decisions).
107. Id. Fleet Factorsfound that courts must construe "ambiguous statutory
terms" such as "participating in the management" to favor lender liability to
accomplish the purpose of placing CERCLA cleanup responsibility upon the
party responsible for the waste. Id.
108. Id. at 1558 (court suggested lenders can deal with borrower without
drawing liability).
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est.109 However, Fleet Factors failed to define the amount of
monitoring or involvement in financial decisions that can create the
potential to affect hazardous waste decisions and thereby trigger
CERCLA liability.1 10 Therefore, pursuant to Fleet Factors, lenders
are unaware of the impact of their actions and whether these activities may draw CERCLA liability"'
After Fleet Factors,the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also attempted to interpret CERCLA's "participating in the management"
provision." 2 In In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.,113 the court again neglected to define the parameters of "participation."" 4 Bergsoe
merely set the minimum amount of lender activity with a waste facility necessary to draw CERCLA liability." 5 The Bergsoe Court
agreed with the Pennsylvania district court in Mirabile."6 Bergsoe
found that CERCLA 117 only exempts owners that hold an indicia of
109. Id. However, the court holds "what is relevant is the nature and extent
of the creditor's involvement with the facility, not its motive." Id. at 1560. This

implies that if the lender genuinely acts towards protecting the security interest, but somehow gets too involved with the facility, the lender is still liable. Id.
The Fleet Factors Court gave no weight to the concern that a stringent liability
standard would provide a disincentive for lenders to involve themselves with
borrowers that have potential hazardous waste problems. Id. Instead, the court
maintained that this potential for liability should encourage lenders to thoroughly investigate the waste treatment systems and policies of their borrowers,
and to reflect any increased risk of liability in the terms of the loan. Id.
110. Id. at 1558 (court fails to define degree of monitoring or financial involvement permitted before CERCLA liability attaches).
111. Id. at 1557 (actions that constitute capacity to influence waste decisions).
112. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). Bergsoe Metal
Corporation specialized in lead recycling. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 669. The East
Asiatic Company, Ltd., East Asiatic Company, Inc. and Heidelberg Eastern, Inc.
(collectively labelled 'EAC") own all the Bergsoe Metal Corporation's stock.
Id. Another party to the litigation is the Port of St. Helens ("Port"), a municipal
corporation organized under Oregon law to issue revenue bonds to promote industrial development in St. Helens, Oregon. Id. Through a myriad of transactions, the United States National Bank of Oregon ('Bank") completed the
financing for Bergsoe's recycling operations. Id. at 670. The primary financial
device consisted of revenue bonds, issued by the Port, held in trust for the bondholders of the Bank. Id. The bond sale revenues went to Bergsoe who was
obligated to pay the money owed on the bonds to the Bank. Id. The Bergsoe
financial package consisted of two transactions. Id. First, Bergsoe conveyed a
warranty deed to the Port for the property and the recycling plant Id. The
second transaction consisted of two mortgage and trust indentures between the
Port and the Bank. Id.
113. Id- at 668.
114. Id. at 672 (court failed to define management participation).
115. Id (court set minimum of amount of lender activity that triggers
liability).
116. Id at 671 (Bergsoe agreed with Mirabilethat protection of security property does not qualify as participation with management).
117. Id at 670-71. Bergsoe found that the Port owned the Bergsoe plant because the deed for the plant and the property was in the Port's name. Id. at 671.
The fact that the Port held title to the plant did not conclusively lead to CERCLA liability. Id. The court had to determine the reason for the Port's ownership. Id.
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ownership to protect their security interest and do not participate
in the facility management." s In addition, the Bergsoe Court determined that a creditor who exercises actual management authority
over a facility is liable under CERCLA.119 The court defined actual
management as the lender making operational decisions at the facility.120 Therefore, under Bergsoe, a lender remains exempt from
CERCLA liability so long as the lender does not participate in the
facility management. 2 Although Bergsoe held that some lender
management participation must occur for the lender to incur CERCLA liability, the court failed to define what level of management
22
participation draws lender liability.1
At the present time the status of CERCLA lender liability remains undefined. Lenders lack the guidance necessary to direct
their actions and to evade liability. After Bergsoe, lenders are
aware that some management participation is necessary to incur liability.12s However, the exact amount of participation required to
118. Id- To determine if the security interest exemption affords relief to the
lender, a court must determine the reason the lender holds an indicia of ownership. Id. The Bergsoe Court concluded that the only reason the Port had a security interest in the plant and property was to ensure that Bergsoe met its
lease and bond obligations. Id. The Port held title to the property. Id. However, it held title to guarantee that Bergsoe covered the Port's own debt under
the bonds. Id. The Port divorced itself from the Bergsoe operation once the
Bank financed the plant. Id. The Port's only action was to approve the project
and issue bonds to facilitate the financing. Id. The leases gave Bergsoe the following indicia of ownership: (1) the responsibility to pay property taxes; (2) the
responsibility to purchase insurance; and (3) the risk of loss for destruction or
damage to the property. Id.
119. Id. at 672. Since Bergsoe found that the Port possessed only a security
interest in the property, the remaining issue was whether the Port sufficiently
participated with the Bergsoe management to draw liability. Id. at 671. Bergsoe
examined the court's holding in FleetFactors that addressed management participation and CERCLA liability. Id. at 672. However, the Bergsoe Court refused to engage in lender participation line drawing and to define the activities
that exempt and expose a lender to liability. Id. Additionally, the Bergsoe
Court refused to rule upon the validity of the Fleet Factorsholding. Id. The
Bergsoe Court held that "whatever the precise parameters of 'participation,'
there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor
will fall outside the exemption." Id. at 671 (emphasis added). However, it perceived its interpretation of CERCLA's minimum level of management participation as consistent with Fleet Factors. Id. at 672 n.3.
120. Id at 672 (actual management equals making operational decisions at
the site).
121. Id. Bergsoe held that Port did not draw CERCLA liability because Port
refrained from actual participation in the management of Bergsoe. Id. Additionally, Bergsoe concluded, management does not encompass a secured creditor
negotiating for rights to protect the investment. Id. The judicial focus evaluating "participating in management" is not what rights that the creditor possessed
but instead what rights the creditor exercises. Id. at 673.
122. Id at 672 (court failed to define minimum level of lender management
participation that triggers CERCLA liability).
123. Id. (established some level of lender management participation necessary to incur CERCLA liability).
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trigger liability is unknown.124 Pursuant to Fleet Factors,both the
capacity to affect waste decisions and strict financial involvement
may trigger CERCLA liability.12- However, Fleet Factors did not
define either the level of capacity or the extent of financial involvement necessary to incur liability.126 Additionally, Maryland Bank
found a lender that held title to a foreclosed property for four years
liable under CERCLA. 2 7 But, MarylandBank failed to define the
minimum length of time that a lender could hold title to a foreclosed property without incurring CERCLA liability.128 Lenders
lack judicial guidance regarding CERCLA liability. 129 This lack of
guidance penalizes a lender because the courts' focus have been on
what level of actions a lender has taken, not on whether those actions were undertaken responsibly. 30 As a consequence, everyday
lenders confront real-life decisions without any reliable standards
that define the extent of future liability. 131

IV. PROPOSALS TO DEFINE LENDER LIABILITY
In response to Fleet Factorsand Bergsoe, legislative and administrative agencies advanced proposals to define the parameters of
CERCLA lender liability. First, Representative John J. LaFalce of
New York introduced House Bill 4494 to limit lender liability in
foreclosure actions. 132 Second, Senator Jake Garn of Utah intro124. Id. (no level of participation defined that draws liability).

125. United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990) (both
management capacity and financial involvement may trigger CERCLA liability), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). Under the "capacity to influence" and

"inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal" standards, a lender,
without being labelled an owner or operator, can find itself liable under CERCLA if it would have exercised control over a borrower's activities regarding
hazardous waste treatment but failed to do so. Joseph Forte & 0. Ochman, An
Update on EnvironmentalLiability,PROB. & PRoP., Jan. - Feb. 1991, at 23. At
the same time, a lender that exercises control over its borrower's activities regarding hazardous waste treatment runs the risk of losing its secured creditor
statutory exemption. Id. at 24. Additionally, Fleet Factors perpetuates the
doubt initiated in MarylandBank of whether a lender can seize or foreclose on
its collateral without incurring CERCLA liability.
126. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553 (amount of management capacity or financial involvement necessary to receive CERCLA liability not expressed).
127. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80
(D. Md. 1986) (holding title to foreclosed property containing waste draws CERCLA liability).
128. Id. (court failed to define length of time necessary to hold title to foreclosed polluted property before liability occurs).
129. David Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks Under
Superfund; EnvironmentalRisks May GrowforLenders, NAT. LAw J., Sept. 17,
1990, at 18 (lenders incur liability because the do not know how to act).
130. Id. (lenders lack judicial guidance concerning liability).
131. Id. (lenders forced to make lending decisions without knowing CERCLA liability ramifications).
132. HR. 4494, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990) (amendment to CERCLA introduced in House of Representatives).
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duced Senate Bill 2827 to create sweeping strict liability exemptions
for lenders related to any hazardous waste release, storage, or disposal.133 Third, tha EPA proposed a draft rule to the White House
Office of Management and Budget on September 14, 1990.134 The
EPA proposal defined the secured creditor exemption in a manner
that permitted a broad range of lender activity when conducted primarily to protect a lender's security interest. The EPA proposal
135
also perpetuates the remedial environmental goals of CERCLA.
Each of these three proposals address the current uncertain standard of CERCLA liability from a different avenue and through a
different mechanism.
Representative LaFalce's bill, H.R. 4494, attempts to directly
amend CERCLA. 3 6 H.R. 4494's definition of "owner or operator"
excludes a "designated lending institution" 137 that acquires control
of a facility pursuant to the terms of a security agreement or a release from liability.Ias H.R. 4494's definition also excludes both corporate and individual fiduciaries that acquire title through trust or
estate terms, and indenture trustees 39 that obtain title pursuant to
a default. 140 Instead of defining standards to promote responsible
lender action, H.R. 4494 seeks to totally exclude lenders as a potentially liable class of "owners or operators."'14 1 Since Congress failed
133. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (amendment to Federal Deposit Insurance Act introduced in Senate).
134. EPA Draft Lays Out Lender Liability for Site Cleanup, 59 U.S.L.W.
2225 (1990) [hereinafter Lender Liability] (EPA introduced proposal to interpret CERCLA).
135. Id. (draft defines lender activities exempt from CERCLA liability).
136. H.R. 4494 (direct amendment to CERCLA).
137. H.R. 4494, § 1. H.R. 4494 defines a "designated lending institution" to
include the following: (1) any depository institution; (2) any leasing company;
(3) any institution in the Farm Credit System; (4) any trust company; and (5)
any other person which is a bona fide lending institution which made real estate
loans in an aggregate amount of $1,000,000 to 25 or more borrowers. Using this
broad definition, Representative LaFalce intended to exempt from CERCLA
liability all organized lending entities engaged in any form of real estate financing. Id.
138. H.R. 4494, § 1. The H.R. 4494 liability exemption covers "[A] designated
lending institution which acquires ownership or control of the facility pursuant
to the terms of a security interest held by the person in that facility." H.R. 4494
§ 1 amends 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(D) (1987). H.R. 4494. Section 9601 defines an
"owner or operator" as a responsible party for response costs. H.R. 4494, § 1.
However, H.R. 4494 excludes any lender that acquires title to a polluted property through a foreclosure action or lease security interest term. Id.
139. An indenture is a written agreement that authorizes the issuance of
bonds and debentures, states the form of the bond, the amount of the issue, the
maturity date, the interest rate, the description of the pledged assets and other
terms. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (6th ed. 1990).
140. H.R. 4494, § 1 (1990) (amendment expands liability exemption to include corporate and individual fiduciaries and indenture trustees).
141. Rick Eyerdam, Lenders Would Escape Liability for Environment
Under Rule, S. FLA. Bus. J., Oct. 8, 1990, at 1. H.R. 4494 proposes "blanket
immunity" allowing lenders to foreclose on property and to conduct loan work-
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to enact H.R. 4494 prior to the conclusion of the 101st Congress, the
bill expired. 142 H.R. 4494 will remain dead until a representative
1 43
reintroduces the bill in the 102d Congress.
Senator Garn's proposal, S. 2827, minimizes CERCLA lender
liability by amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA")
to protect insured depository institutions from hazardous waste liability.144 The FDIA amendment proposes that federally insured
banks be excused from liability under any law that decrees strict
liability for the release of hazardous waste. 145 The FDIA amendment fails to directly refer to CERCLA.148 However, it indirectly
incorporates CERCLA liability since CERCLA imposes strict liability upon owners and operators of hazardous waste sites.147 Lenders
that cause or possess actual knowledge of a release of hazardous
waste are not exempted under this amendment.148 Unfortunately,
outs without triggering CERCLA liability. Id. The proposed redefinition of the
term "owner or operator" frustrates the purpose of CERCLA which is to foster
responsible environmental waste cleanup behavior and to insure the government receives reimbursement for EPA response costs expenditures. rd.
142. H.R. 4494, § 1. (bill not passed before end of 101st session). Every bill
introduced in Congress is subject to the two-year deadline of the congressional
session. WALTER OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 19 (Congressional Quarterly Press 3d ed., 1989). The 101st session of Congress began at noon on January 3, 1989, and expired at noon on January 3,1991.
Id. Once a bill is introduced, both the House and the Senate must pass the bill
within the two-year session in order for the bill to become law. Id. If either the
House or the Senate fails to pass the bill before the end of the session the bill
automatically dies and must be reintroduced in a new session of Congress. Id.
143. See id. Since the House failed to pass H.R. 4494 before January 3,1991,
H.R. 4494 died and must be introduced in a future session. Id.
144. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 35(b) (1990) (amendment exempts lenders from hazardous substance liability).
145. Id. S. 2827 provides:
No insured depository institution or mortgage lender shall be liable under
any law imposing strict liability for the release, threatened release, storage
or disposal of a hazardous substance or similar material from property. (1)
acquired through foreclosure; (2) held in a fiduciary capacity-, or (3) held,
controlled or managed pursuant to the terms of an extension of credit.
This exemption covers both federally insured depository institutions and
mortgage lenders. Id. The term "mortgage lender" includes any person whose
business is to extend credit secured by real property. Id. All transactions in
which a depository institution and mortgage lender acquire property by
purchase at a sale "under judgment or decree, power of sale, from a trustee,"
pursuant to an extension of credit, are included in the exemption. Id. Additionally, the exemption includes lease transactions that are equivalent to a secured
loan. Id.
146. Id. (FDIA amendment does not refer to CERCLA).
147. Id. CERCLA imposes strict liability on responsible parties found to
own or operate a site containing hazardous waste. State of New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict liability under CERCLA.
148. S.2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 35(c) (1990). The FDIA amendment exemption excludes the following groups of lenders:
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the FDIA amendment includes the same defect as Representative
LaFalce's bill. The FDIA amendment frustrates CERCLA's remedial environmental purpose through the creation of a lender loophole. 149 This loophole allows lenders to ignore any environmental
responsibilities.15 0 Similar to LaFalce's bill, the Senate neglected to
151
pass Senator Garn's proposal before the 101st session ended.
Therefore, Garn's bill remains dead.'5 2
Since both the House and Senate bills suffered congressional
death, the EPA proposal remains the only viabl6 proposal to define
CERCLA lender liability.153 The EPA proposal seeks to reconcile a
lender's need to manage funds with the EPA's duty to cleanup
waste sites and recover expended Superfund assets.1- 4 The EPA
The exemption ... shall not apply to any person: (1) that has caused the
release or the threatened release or disposal of a hazardous substance or
similar material.. .that gives rise to removal, remedial, or similar action;
(2) with actual knowledge that a hazardous substance or similar material is
used, stored or located [and] ... failed to take all reasonable actions necessary to prevent the release or disposal of such substance; (3) that has benefited from the removal, remedial or other response action, but only to the
extent of the actual benefit conferred by such action on that person.

Id
Therefore, lenders to a particular site remain liable under CERCLA if
they- (1) possessed knowledge about hazardous waste; (2) stood to gain from the
removal of the waste; or, (3) caused the release of the hazardous waste. Id.
149. Id. (bill creates lender environmental loophole).
150. 1& The FDIA amendment exemption deters lenders from performing
environmental due diligence or monitoring the borrower's manufacturing practices. Eyerdam, supranote 141, at 1. A lender is potentially liable for the CERCLA cleanup if it discovers information regarding the borrower's hazardous
waste practices. Id. If a lender does not inquire, it does not risk CERCLA liability. Id. Likewise, if a lender does not get involved with the borrower's facility
to a degree to cause the release of a hazardous substance, a lender remains protected by the FDIA liability exemption. Id. Therefore, if a lender does not ask
or does not participate in the production, a lender is not liable for CERCLA
cleanup costs. Id. This lender inaction does not curtail hazardous waste practices or assist the government in recovering CERCLA response costs. Id.
Therefore, pursuant to the FDIA amendment, lenders may undermine CERCLA's environmental purpose. Id.
151. Id (bill not passed before end of 101st session). See supranotes 142 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how bills expire if they are not passed by
the end of the session.
152. See OLEsZEK, supra note 142, at 19. Since the Senate failed to pass S.
2827 before January 3, 1991, S. 2827 died and must be introduced in a future
session. Id.
153. EPA Proposes Rule to Limit Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 55
BNA's BANKING REP. 607 (1990). As of the writing of this comment, the EPA
proposal limiting CERCLA lender liability remained under review at the White
House Office of Management and Budget.
154. EPA Draft Lays Out Lender Liability for Site Cleanup, 59 U.S.L.W.
2224 (1990). The EPA proposal marks the first time, since the enactment of
CERCLA, that the EPA has interpreted the security interest exemption in a
ruling. Id. James Strock, the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Enforcement,
characterized the EPA's proposal as an effort to hold off pending legislation in
both the House (H.R. 4494) and the Senate (S. 2827) that would dilute CERCLA's liability language and hamper CERCLA's purpose. Id. James Strock
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proposal interprets the secured creditor exemption to permit a
broad range of lender activity when this activity is conducted primarily to protect a security interest.1 5 The EPA's approach is to
give lenders a clear indication of the actions that trigger liability
under CERCLA. 156 In pursuit of clarity, the EPA proposal attempts to clearly define the following terms of the security interest
exemption: "(1) indicia of ownership; (2) primarily to protect a security interest; and (3) participating in the management of a ...
facility."'1 7 A clear definition of these terms provides guidelines
necessary to maintain CERCLA's purpose while simultaneously encouraging responsible lender activity. 58
First, the EPA proposal defines "indicia of ownership" as interests "in real or personal property held as a security or collateral for
a loan, including the real or personal property acquired in the
course of protecting the security interest."159 This definition only
extends to lenders' rights designed to assure the borrower's repayment. 16 Thus, under the security interest exemption, a lenders'
"ownership" is measured by the extent the facility or collateral represents the borrower's guaranteefor the unpaid obligation. 1 1 The
"ownership" is not in the facility itself.16 2 Therefore, the exempt
"indicia of ownership" is the interest the lender holds to guarantee
further expressed that the issue of how the secured creditor exemption is interpreted created a great deal of uncertainty in the financial and lending communities. Id. This uncertainty came as a result of what Strock labelled as dicta in
Fleet Factors. Id.
155. EPA DRAFT PRoPosAL DEFINING LENDER LIABLrIY IssuEs UNDER THE
SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION OF CERCLA 3 (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Daily

Rep. for Executives) (Sept. 14,1990) [hereinafter EPA DRAFT PROPOSAL]. The
EPA draft proposal labelled the secured creditor exemption a "shield" from

CERCLA liability. Id. The exemption is not a loan guarantee for lending institutions to "shift to Superfund the cost of poor loan decisions." Id.

156. Id. (proposal gives lenders certainty by defining terms in CERCLA).
157. Id. The operative language of the security interest exemption states
that the term "owner or operator... does not include a person, who without
participating in the management of the vessel or facility, holds indicia of owner-

ship primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A) (1987).
158. EPA DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 4 (proposal promotes CER-

CLA and responsible lender activity).

159. Id. The EPA proposal listed examples of indicia that are representative,
but not exhaustive, of the interpretation of "indicia of ownership." Id. These

examples include: mortgages; deeds of trust; legal titles obtained through foreclosure; or assignments, liens, pledges, or other rights to or encumbrances
against the facility that is furnished by the borrower as a security for the loan.

Id. To qualify for the exemption, the mortgage, lien or encumbrance must be
the intended security for the loan. Id. No other interest in the nature of an
investment qualifies for the security interest exemption. Id.
160. EPA DRAFT PROPOsAL, supranote 155, at 4 (lender's ownership represents only the assurance of repayment).
161. Id. (ownership interest guarantees repayment).
162. Id. (interest is only a guarantee, not the ownership of the facility).
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repayment. 163
Second, the EPA proposal defines acts "primarily to protect the
security interest" as necessary and required acts undertaken to protect the property interest created as security for the loan. 164 The
EPA propo.mal allows a lender to employ three types of protective
actions to protect its security interest: (1) inquiry requirements at
the making of the loan; (2) monitoring requirements during the life
of the loan; and, (3) loan workout and foreclosure activities.16 The
EPA proposal recognizes CERCLA's environmental purpose by dictating that the lender, seeking shelter from CERCLA liability, undertakes affirmative obligations toward the property prior to
making the loan. 166 Therefore, to avoid CERCLA liability, a lender
must perform an environmental audit 1 67 to ascertain the condition
163. Id. (interest insures loan repayment).
164. Id. at 5. The secured creditor exemption does not apply to ownership in
property for investment purposes because the purpose of holding the property
is not the assurance of repayment. Id. Additionally, the secured creditor exemption has no application when the lender acts as a trustee, manager or any
other non-lending capacity toward the property or business. I&L
165. Id. (liability avoiding loan protection acts divided into three time
frames).
166. I& at 6. CERCLA's broad remedial goal requires that a lender, intent
on avoiding CERCLA liability, act consistently with CERCLA's purpose. Id.
The lender must do so to qualify for the secured creditor exemption. Id. Lenders comply with CERCLA's purpose when they inspect and audit the environmental condition of the collateral securing the loan. Id. A lender fails to
qualify for the security interest exemption by neglecting to conduct an environmental audit. Id.
167. The environmental audit is a flexible mechanism structured to accomplish management needs. LAwRENCE HARRMSON, THE McGRAw-HILL ENViRON.
MENTAL AUDITING HANDBOOK, A GUIDE TO CORPORATE AND ENviONMENTAL
RISK MANAGEMENT §§ 1-12 to 1-13 (1984). In its simplest form, the environmental audit analyzes a company's present compliance with federal, state, and local
environmental regulation. Id. To determine regulatory compliance, an environmental audit checks whether the company obtained all the required environmental permits, made all required reports accurately and promptly, and
disposed all hazardous waste properly. Id. at 1-13. An environmental audit can
be much more specific. Id. An environmental audit can encompass the following- an analysis of samples in different laboratories; a determination of whether
inside and contractor laboratories provide an accurate analysis of the wastes; an
examination of past hazardous waste disposal practices that may present future
environmental liabilities; and a consideration of future control requirements to
determine whether adequate environmental provisions exist in the corporate
budget. Id. An environmental audit aids early recognition and identification of
possible hazardous waste problems. Kenneth R. Myers & Thomas J. McCaffery, The Goals and Techniques of EnvironmentalAudits, 30 PRAc. LAW. 41, 42
(1984). An environmental audit will provide both notice of hazardous waste
problems and information concerning the costs of remedying the problems discovered. Id. at 47. An environmental auditor must possess scientific and engineering expertise as well as a legal background to interpret the regulatory
standards. Id. The two primary forms of an environmental audit are the traditional audit and the mass balance environmental audit. Id. The traditional
audit evaluates implementation programs by examining environmental control
systems and the materials that enter those systems. Id. To perform a traditional audit, the audit team evaluates the facility's waste management program
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of the property before granting a loan.lca During the life of the
by following waste streams from generation to disposal. Id. In addition to evaluating the facility's waste process, the traditional audit includes monitoring the
air and water treatment programs. rd. The weakness of the traditional audit is
that it will not determine whether the facility's control system is immune from
future environmental liability. rd. A mass balance environmental audit may be
required to predict future environmental liability. Id.
A mass balance environmental audit tracks materials and byproducts from
the time these materials enter the facility, through processing and storage, to
final dispositional. Id. This form of an environmental audit includes a thorough review of the facility's purchasing, processing, transportation and sales
functions in addition to the normal analysis of treatment, storage and disposal
activities. Id. Corporations use the mass balance environmental audit primarily
to detect future problems at an early stage. Id. Therefore, an environmental
audit organizes environmental data to assess compliance, estimates the cost of
future environmental compliance, and predicts future exposure to environmental liability. Id. at 52.
Regardless of whether the traditional or mass balance environmental audit
is performed, the audit must contain additional elements to reduce future CERCLA liability. Id. at 53. The audit must identify potential problem areas of
waste treatment. Id. After the original audit, the audit staff will schedule future facility visits at irregular intervals with minimal advance notice to insure

the staff observes a realistic performance of the facility. Id. Additionally, the

audit staff installs a "tickler" system to assure that permits are routinely renewed before they expire and that all important permit conditions remain satisfied. Id. Finally, the auditors explain the environmental regulations to the
plant managers and supervisors to assist in future compliance. Id. The proposed environmental audit rectifies past disclosure inadequacies while aiding
the facility in achieving compliance and defending against future liability
claims. Id.
168. EPA DRAFT PRoPOsAL, supra note 155, at 6 (environmental audit required prior to extending credit to preserve lender's ability to use the security
interest exemption).
The EPA also recommends that loan agreements contain lender imposed
requirements for financial, environmental and other warranties from the borrower as conditions for the loan. Id. While the EPA proposal requires lenders
to undertake affirmative action consistent with CERCLA, a lender is not required to guarantee or insure the environmental safety at a facility. Id. However, the inclusion of environmental warranties or covenants in the loan
agreement are not considered to be evidence of a lender acting as an insurer or
guarantor. Id. Therefore, liability cannot be premised on the existence of such
terms, or upon the lender's actions to ensure that the facility is managed in an
environmentally sound manner. Id.
Even though the EPA proposal advocates indemnity agreements and contracting away environmental liability to the borrower, it remains uncertain how
the courts will treat this language in a loan agreement. See United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 239 (W.D. Mo. 1986). In Conservation, the district court acknowledged the ability of contractual agreements to
modify the allocation of liability between the borrower and the lender. Id. The
court held that CERCLA does not prohibit indemnification agreements but
neither does CERCLA encourage or authorize indemnification agreements. Id.
The Conservation Court interpreted 42 U.S.C.A § 9607(a). Id. Section 9607(a)
provides:
No indemnification, hold harmless or similar agreement or conveyance
shall be effective to transfer from.., any person who may be liable for a
release or threat of release... to any other person the liability imposed
under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to
insure, hold harmless or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this section.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 25:349

loan, the EPA proposal directs the lender to regularly monitor the
property and to obtain assurance of the borrower's compliance with
environmental law.16 9 Finally, if the debtor incurs financial difficulties, the EPA proposal establishes guidelines for a loan
workout' 70 and foreclosure. 171 Both the loan workout and foreclosure qualify as acts designed to protect the lender's security
interest. 172
Generally, lender loan workout activities do not violate the
clause "primarily to protect the security interest" when the borrower remains the ultimate decision maker for the operational
management of the facility.1 73 However, when a lender must fore-

close on the property, its acquisition must be necessary to ensure
the satisfaction of the borrower's debt obligation. 7 4 In addition, the
acquisition must remain within the EPA's definition of acting to
protect the security interest.175 A foreclosure must proceed to terminate the borrower's operation and prepare the property for a subsequent sale.1 76 Moreover, to remain within the security interest

42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1987).
The Conservation Court found that § 9607(a) did not prohibit indemnification agreements. Id. However, the court failed to determine whether an indemnity agreement would be upheld. Id. at 240. It remains uncertain how
future courts will view indemnity agreements between lenders and borrowers.
Id.
169. EPA DRAFT PROPosAL, supra note 155, at 6. In addition to obtaining
the borrower's assurance of compliance with federal, state, and local environmental laws, a lender must conduct site inspections of the collateral to remain
qualified for the security interest exemption. Id.
170. A "loan workout" is an agreement between the debtor and the creditor
to restructure or refinance nonperforming or overdue loans. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (6th ed. 1990). Loan workout activities are lender actions to pro-

tect and preserve their security interest by assisting the debtor in an effort to
prevent default of the loan or the diminution of the value of the collateral.
EPA DRAFT PROPOsAL, supra note 155, at 7.
171. EPA DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 7 (proposal establishes guidelines for foreclosures and workouts).
172. I A lender's actions during a workout, foreclosure or liquidation must
consider and address any hazardous substances known to be present at the facility and must not cause or contribute to a release of hazardous substances. Id.
173. Id The EPA proposal allows the following loan workout activities: (1)
restructuring or renegotiating the terms of the loan obligation; (2) payment of
additional interest; and (3) extension of the payment period or forbearance. Id.
The above listed activities are representative, but do not exhaust the allowed
workout activities. Id.
174. Id. (foreclosure must be necessary to guarantee repayment to remain
exempt).
175. Id. A lender's temporary acquisition must be reasonably necessary to
assure the satisfaction or performance of the loan. Id. The lender's action in
outbidding or refusing bids from parties offering fair consideration for the property evidences that the property is no longer being held "primarily to protect
the security interest." Id.
176. Id. Winding up the operations entails the necessary actions to terminate the facility's operations, to secure the site and to otherwise protect the
value of the foreclosed assets for liquidation. Id.
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exemption, a lender must be divested of the property within six
months of foreclosure. 177 Therefore, when the lender must foreclose, only methodical and affirmative actions toward collateral divestment insulate the lender from liability.178
Finally, the EPA defined lender activity that constitutes "participation in the management of a facility" as any activity that precludes the lender from using the security interest exemption to
escape CERCLA liability.17 9 The EPA considers the lender a management participant when it divests the borrower of decision making control over operational procedures while the borrower remains
in possession of the facility. 80 "Participation in the management of
a facility" means the lender's actual exercise of management control.18 ' The EPA expressly excluded from its definition the mere
capacity to control or to influence a facility's operations.'8 2 Therefore, direct or actual participation in the management of a site is
required before a lender is precluded from using the security interest exemption to avoid CERCLA liability.183 When the borrower
continues to make operational decisions, a lender is generally not a
participant in management.'8 4

V. A BALANCED SOLUTION: THE EPA PROPOSAL
The EPA proposal defining the security interest exemption is
the best approach to remedy the inconsistent judicial treatment of
lender liability under CERCLA for three reasons. First, the EPA
proposal advances CERCLA's purpose of protecting the environment from damage caused by improper waste practices. Second, the
177. Id A presumption exists that a lender remains within the protection of
the security interest exception when it divests from the foreclosed property
within six months. Id. If a lender remains vested with the foreclosed property
beyond six months, the burden shifts to the lender to demonstrate that it continues to hold the property primarily to protect the security interest. Id.
178. Id. (affirmative action toward divestment protects the lender from
CERCLA liability).
179. Id. at 8 (EPA defines participation in management precluding lender
use of the security interest exemption).

180. Ir& The EPA defines "participating in the management of the facility"
as the lender's divestment of the borrower from the operational decision making process toward the facility. Id. If a lender divests the borrower from the

decision making process, the lender is no longer protected by the security interest exemption. Id.
181. Id. (actual management required to preclude the use of the security interest exemption and incur CERCLA liability).
182. Id The EPA proposal directly overrules the holding in Fleet Factors.
Id. To incur liability, a lender must directly participate in management. Id.
The mere ability to effect hazardous waste treatment will not expose a lender
to CERCLA liability. Id.
183. Id. (participation required to preclude utilization of the security interest
exemption).
184. Id. (protecting security interest is not management participation).
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EPA proposal addresses the judicial concerns illustrated in past
cases regarding CERCLA lender liability, while simultaneously
outlining responsible lender behavior to avoid liability. Third, the
judiciary must defer to the EPA's interpretation of lender liablility
embodied in the EPA proposal.
First, the EPA proposal advances CERCLA's purpose to protect our health and the environment from the damage caused by
improper waste practices. 185 CERCLA furthers the ultimate purpose of safeguarding the environment by holding corporations re18
sponsible for environmental damage and massive cleanup costs.

6

This purpose serves to deter other corporations from releasing hazardous substances.1 8 7 The EPA proposal also adds another deterrence weapon to CERCLA.1sa The proposal requires lenders to
perform environmental audits prior to the loan and to perform site
inspections during the life of the loan. 8 9 The audit and the inspections are monitoring devices designed to detect, address, and prevent the release of hazardous waste before it damages the
environment.190 Thus, the EPA proposal motivates the lender to
discover and address site waste production since the lender incurs
liability if the EPA finds waste at the site. 191 The cost of the environmental audit and site inspections is much less than the cost of
185. Id. at 5 (CERCLA purpose remains fending for health and
environment).
186. Florida Power & Light v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317
(11th Cir. 1990) (CERCLA purpose is to recover response costs from responsible
corporations).
187. Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1458, 1539 (1986). The deterrence theory works under the assumption that
if waste generators must pay CERCLA cleanup costs, other corporations will
avoid waste production to avert CERCLA liability. Id. at 1540.
188. EPA DRAFT PRoPosAT, supra note 155, at 6 (EPA proposal adds deterrence weapon added to CERCLA).
189. Id. To remain eligible to utilize the security interest exemption, a
lender must conduct an environmental audit and inspect a facility prior to executing a loan. Id. If a lender fails to perform the proper environmental diligence, the security interest exemption is not available as a defense to CERLA
liability. Id.
190. Id. A lender remains liable under CERCLA for the borrower's release
of hazardous waste when the lender performs an environmental audit, discovers the borrower's operation releases hazardous waste, fails to require the borrower to remedy the hazardous release, and executes the loan. Id. When the
lender ignores the discovery of hazardous waste, the lender lozcs the right to
use the security interest exemption. Id.
191. Id. A lender also possesses an affirmative obligation to continue to inspect the borrower's site during the life of the loan. Id. WN'hen the lender discovers the facility is releasing hazardous waste during the life of the loan and
fails to initiate any remedial action, the lender loses the right use the security
interest exemption. Id. The risk of losing eligibility for the security interest
exemption motivates a lender to act toward safeguarding against the release of
hazardous waste. Id.
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CERCLA liability. 9 2 Therefore, these audits prevent waste release
and avert environmental pollution, as well as further CERCLA's
purpose.'

93

Second, the EPA proposal addresses past judicial concerns regarding CERCLA lender liability while simultaneously defining re94
sponsible lender action that prevents CERCLA liability.'
Lenders utilized the security interest exemption to avoid EPA
claims to recover CERCLA response costs.' 95 Historically, the
courts inconsistently interpreted the meaning of the security interest exemption and failed to establish a standard for its application.'96 To date, lender liability cases focused on whether a lender
foreclosed on the secured property, whether the lender acquired ti192. Id. The cost of CERCLA liability can exceed $50 million. Id. However,
the cost of an environmental audit rarely exceeds $1 million. Id.
193. Note, supra note 187, at 1541 (preventing hazardous waste releases
reduces pollution problems and advances CERCLA policy).
194. EPA DRAFr PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 4. The EPA proposal seeks to
balance a lender's need for certainty against the EPA's duty to cleanup waste
sites and recover Superfund expenditures in cleansing the sites. Id.
195. In United States v. Mirabile, American Bank claimed protection from
CERCLA liability under the security interest exemption. United States v.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). See supra
notes 74-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mirabile.
In United States v. MarylandBank & Trust Company, Maryland Bank contended their immunity from CERCLA liability based upon the security interest
exemption. United States v. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Md.
1986). See supra notes 86-94 and accompany text for a discussion of Maryland
Bank.
In United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp., Fleet Factors moved for summary
judgment, claiming liability protection under the security interest exemption.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). See supra notes 97-111 and accompany text for a
discussion of Fleet Factors.
In BergsoeMetal Corp., the Port responded to the CERCLA liability allegation claiming protection under the security interest exemption. In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 112-24 and accompany text for a discussion of Bergsoe.
196. In dictum, the Long Court said that foreclosure does not give rise to
CERCLA liability because it is a logical action taken by a lender to protect its
financial position when a borrower defaults. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45
Bankr. 278, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). In Mirabile,the court held that if the
lender forecloses on property to protect a security interest and avoids becoming
"overly entangled" in the borrower's waste production, that foreclosure fails to
trigger CERCLA liability. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996. The Maryland
Bank Court held that the security interest exemption does not avoid CERCLA
liability when a lender holds title to the property after purchasing the security
property at a foreclosure sale. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579. The Fleet
Factors Court held that if the lender "participat[es] in the financial management of the facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous waste," the security interest exemption fails to
protect the lender from CERCLA liability. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557. The
Bergsoe Court held that before the security interest exemption ceases to prevent CERCLA liability, the court must find that the lender participated in the
actual management of the facility. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 673.
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tle to the security, and to what degree the lender participated in the
management of the facility.19
The EPA proposal designs a new standard that is easy for lenders to follow.198 It establishes both foreclosure procedures and the
level of allowable management participation that triggers CERCLA
liability.' 99 Upon foreclosure, the EPA proposal allows a lender to
acquire title to the collateral and still receive the protection of the
security interest exemption. 200 The EPA proposal requires that the
foreclosure be reasonably necessary to assure the performance of
the loan obligation. 20 1 The EPA proposal further requires that the
lender progress toward the termination of the facility and the sale
of the property.20 2 Finally, the EPA directs the lender to divest itself of the property within six months of the foreclosure in order to
20 3
avoid liability.
197. The Long Court dictum addressed lender foreclosure. Long, 45 Bankr.
at 288. The Mirabile Court ruled on the lenders foreclosure and assignment of
the security. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996. The Maryland Bank Court
found the lenders purchase of the secured property at a foreclosure sale triggered CERCLA liability. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579. The Fleet Factrs Court ruled on the extent of the lender's participation in the management
of the facility. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557. Finally, the Bergsoe Court addressed the degree the lender participated in the management of the facility.
Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 673.
198. EPA DRAFr PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 3 (the EPA proposal defines
CERCLA exempt lender action).
199. Id. (the EPA proposal defines the degree of tolerable lender participation in facility management and the effect of foreclosure on the security interest exemption).
200. Id. at 7 (the lender remains protected by the security interest exemption pursuant to acquiring title to the security from a foreclosure sale).
201. Id. When a lender either refuses or outbids parties offering fair consideration for the collateral, it no longer is acting in a manner reasonably necessary to assure the performance of the loan obligation. Id. Therefore, the
lender is no longer protected against CERCLA liability. Id.
202. Id. A lender may not acquire title to the collateral and passively hold
this title for an extended period of time. Id. The lender must actively strive
towards the termination of operation and the resale of the property to remain
protected by the security interest exemption. Id. Evidence that a lender is
seeking to divest itself expediously of the asset includes, but is not limited to,
advertising or auctioning the facility for sale, listing the property with a realtor
or sales agent, or other actions reasonably demonstrating or manifesting an intent to sell or otherwise divest itself of the asset. Id.
203. Id. When the lender remains vested with title to the security for a period in excess of six months, the burden shifts to the lender to establish that it is
still necessary to hold that title to assure the performance of the obligation,
taking all relevant facts and circumstances into account. Id. If the EPA proposal was followed in the Mirabile decision, the lender's foreclosure would still
receive the security interest protection because the lender assigned the title
within four months of acquiring the title. See United States v. Mirabile, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Instl.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). If the
EPA proposal were imposed upon the Maryland Bank decision, the lender
would have the burden of proof to explain why it was necessary to retain the
title for four years subsequent to the foreclosure. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1896).
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Additionally, the EPA proposal addresses the remaining judicial inconsistencies regarding the level of lender participation that
triggers CERCLA liability.2 " The EPA proposal considers a lender
a management participant when it actually participates in the operational management of the facility. 20 5 In addition, a lender must
divest the borrower of decision making control.2 ° Pursuant to the
EPA proposal, a lender remains protected by the security interest
exemption when it makes a management decision primarily to pro2 7
tect the security of its loan. 0
In addition to resolving judicial concerns over CERCLA lender
liability, the EPA proposal defines a path of responsible action that
lenders may follow to avoid liability.208 The EPA proposal defines
permissible lender activity, promotes environmental protection,
and outlines the parameters of actions that lead to and avert CERCLA liability. 2 ° 9 In order to avoid CERCLA liability and enhance
early detection of waste problems, a lender must conduct an environmental audit or inspection of the property prior to extending the
credit.210 Under the EPA proposal, once the lender extends credit,
it may police both the environmental condition of the property and
the financial condition of the borrower without triggering CERCLA liability. 2'- Additionally, the EPA proposal allows the lender
204. EPA DRAFr PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 8 (proposal defines management participation).
205. Id. (lender must make operational decisions to trigger CERCLA

liability).
206. Id. The EPA proposal directly overrules the Fleet Factors holding because actual management participation is required. Id. Under the EPA proposal, the Fleet Factors language concerning the mere capacity to control or
influence a facility's operation, would be insufficient to attack the security interest exemption. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550,1557 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert denied 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). It is necessary for the lender to
usurp the borrower's operational control to dismiss the protection of the secur-

ity interest exemption. EPA DRAFr PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 8.
207. EPA DRA r PROPOsAL, supra note 155, at 8. Infrequent management
participation or participation designed to protect the security interest does not
destroy the lender's security interest exemption. Id.
208. Id. at 4 (addresses judicial concerns and establishes liability certainty).
209. Id. (defines lender action that avoids CERCLA liability).
210. Id. at 6. CERCLA's broad remedial goal of protecting public health and
the environment from the hazards of improper waste practices requires that a
lender seeking shelter from liability act consistently with the statute's purpose.
Id. A lender must undertake certain affirmative actions at the time of the loan
with respect to the collateral. Id. In order to act consistently with CERCLA, a
lender must conduct a formal inspection of the property or an environmental
audit. Id. When the environmental audit detects hazardous waste, the waste
must be removed prior to the execution of the loan. Id. Failure to remove the
waste will prevent a lender from utilizing the security interest exemption. Id.
211. Id. at 4. Since the EPA proposal expressly allows lenders to monitor
borrowers, it becomes apparent that financial and environmental investigations
will not subject the lender to CERCLA liability for "participation in the management of the facility." Id. at 8. Additionally, by promoting continued environmental investigations during the life of the loan, the EPA proposal overtly
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to participate in management decisions to protect the collateral during the loan period as long as the lender does not divest the borrower of operational management control. 21 2 Only when a lender
divests the borrower of operational control and begins to run the
facility, is the lender susceptible to CERCLA liability.2 1 3 Finally,
when foreclosure becomes necessary, the EPA proposal allows a
lender to avoid CERCLA liability if the lender's foreclosure and
subsequent divestment of the collateral occur within six months.2 14
Therefore, the EPA proposal erases lender liability uncertainty by
establishing definitive lender activity before, during, and after the
loan term.2 1 5
Third, the judiciary must defer to the EPA's interpretation of
lender liablility embodied in the EPA proposal. Ultim,-..ely, the judiciary is the final authority of statutory construction and interpretation.216 However, when confronted with a issue of statutory
rejects the Fleet Factorsstandard of liability. See United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
The mere capacity to control or influence the facility's treatment of hazardous
waste is not sufficient under the EPA proposal to incur liability. EPA DRAFT
PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 8. Lenders may conduct environmental inquiries
with the assurance of not encountering CERCLA liability. Id. However, when
a lender discovers hazardous waste at a facility during the life of the loan, it
must compel the borrower to address the waste problem. Id. Lenders are not
liable as insurers against the production of environmental waste; however, a
lender must act responsibly towards the problem and not ignore it. rd.
212. EPA DRAFT PRoPosAL, supra note 155, at 8. The EPA proposal gives a
lender wide latitude to participate in management decisions designed to protect
the secured property. Id. A lender can participate to the level necessary to
protect its collateral without fear of incurring CERCLA liability. Id. Again,
the EPA proposal rejects the dispersion created by the Fleet Factorsdecision.
Id. The EPA proposal requires that a lender actually participate in the management of a facility and usurp the borrower's control before liability is imposed.
Id. Potential managerial capacity does not trigger CERCLA liability under the
EPA proposal. See supranotes 164-69 and accompanying text for additional information concerning the EPA proposal's treatment of management
participation.
213. Id (lender must divest borrower's management of site to draw CER-

CLA liability).
214. Id. at 7. The EPA proposal assures a lender that, if divestment occurs
within six months of foreclosure, the lender will not incur CERCLA liability as
an "owner" of the facility. Id. Even if the economy or other factors preclude
the lender's divestment within six months, the lender may avoid CERCLA liability by demonstrating to the court that it remains necessary to hold the property to protect its security interest. Id. See supra notes 161-63 and
accompanying text for additional information on foreclosure under the EPA
proposal.
215. Id. at 3. The EPA proposal gives lenders a choice of actions. A lender
may: (1) follow the directions of the EPA proposal and avoid CERCLA lender
liability; or (2) refuse to follow the EPA guidelines and risk CERCLA liability.
Id.
216. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981). 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1987) provides:
To the extent necessary to [a] decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
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construction, the United States Supreme Court defers to the interpretation advanced by the agency charged with the administration
of the statute. 21 7 The EPA possesses the regulatory authority to
enforce CERCLA pursuant to President Reagan's order given in
1981.218 Therefore, since the EPA is the agency charged with administering CERCLA, the courts will accord the EPA's construc21 9
tion of CERCLA lender liability great weight.
Additionally, the courts must give the EPA proposal heightened judicial deference for two reasons. First, an enforcement
agency's statutory interpretation receives greater judicial deference
when the statute is designed to protect public health. 220 A fundastatutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of agency action. The reviewing court shall (1) compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary
* . . an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law, (B)
contrary to the constitutional right; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction.
The courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction.
Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 399 F. Supp. 855, 859 (D.C. Ariz. 1975). The
following decisions hold that the courts possess the Al1 authority to interpret a
statute: SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); Fjederal Maritime Comm'n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 2M1, 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965).
217. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). In Udall, the Supreme Court
considered the amount of deference accorded the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of a provision of the Mineral Leasing Act. Udall,380 U.S. at 4. The
Court found the Secretary's interpretation of the Act deserved great deference
because the Secretary possessed the responsibility for its enforcement. Id. at 16.
The Court affirmed the Secretary's interpretation of the Act. Id. at 23. See also
FederalElection Comm'n, 454 U.S. at 32 (deference given to Federal Election
Comm-ision's interpretation of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 due to
Commission's enforcement authority); Doe v. Department of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., 412 F.2d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1969) (agency charged with administration of Federal Aviation Act shall not be overruled except for weighty reasons).
To pass judicial scrutiny, the agency interpretation must be a reasonable
construction, although it is not necessary that the interpretation be the only
reasonable interpretation of the statute. Udall, 380 U.S. at 16. See also Federal
Election Com'n, 454 U.S. at 32. The EPA proposal reasonably constructs
CERCLA because the proposal promotes CERCLA's purpose and motivates
lenders to act responsibly towards environmental waste releases to avoid CERCLA liability. EPA DRAFr PROPOSAL, supra note 155, at 5. See supra notes
185-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the EPA proposal propels

CERCLA's goals and motivates lenders to take on environmental responsibility
to avoid CERCLA liability.

218. Exec. Order No. 12,286, 46 Fed. Reg. 9901 (1981). Under § 9603(d)(1),
the EPA has authority to create rules and regulations pertaining to CERCLA.

42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(1) (1983).
219. See Udall, 380 U.S. at 16. Courts will affirm reasonable constructions of
statutes made by agencies responsible for enforcing these statutes. Id.
220. Certified Color Mfr. Ass'n v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284,294 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Certified Color involved an action to challenge a ruling by the Commissioner of
Food and Drug Administration which terminated approval for the color additive FD&C Red No. 2. IR at 286. The Commissioner banned the color additive
because the additive endangered public health. Id. The Certied Color Court
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mental purpose of CERCLA is to protect the public health against
the harmful effects of hazardous waste.2 21 Second, agency statutory
constructions receive heightened deference when legislative history
fails to clarify the provisions at issue.2 22 Both CERCLA and its legislative history fail to define the parameters of either the security
interest exemption or lender liability. 2 2s

The courts must, there-

fore, give the EPA proposal deference because the EPA enforces
and the proposal defines the security interest exemption. In addition, the judicial deference must be heightened since no CERCLA
legislative history exists and the statute protects health and the
environment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the past ten years lenders have executed loan agreements,
uncertain about future CERCLA liability because Congress neglected to define the parameters of CERCLA's security interest exemption. Judicial interpretations cast further dispersion on the
parameters of this exemption. For the first time, the EPA proposal
increased the normal level of deference given to agency interpretations. rd. at
294. The court affirmed the agency's construction and held that agency interpretations of statutes deserve increased deference when the statute protects
public health. Id.
221. Floria Power & Light v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317
(11th Cir. 1..3) (reducing hazardous releases advances CERCLA policy of protecting public health).
222. Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In PhiladelphiaTelevision, the appellants, community antenna television operators, challenged the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") interpretation of the Communications Act.
PhiladelphiaTelevision, 359 F.2d at 283. The FCC interpreted the Communications Act's definition of a "common carrier" in a manner that precluded the
appellant's claim. Id. Congress neglected to define the term "common carrier"
when it passed the Communications Act in 1934. Id. at 284. The Philadelphia
Television Court affirmed the FCC's construction and held that "deference
[given] to the agency's interpretation of its governing statute is reinforced
where, as here, the legislative history is silent, or at best unhelpful, with respect
to the point in question." Id. See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 35 (1981) (when legislative history is
silent, agency construction is given great judicial deference).
223. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1980). Many terms of CERCLA remain undefined. Id.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's lack of
legislative history and statutory definitions.
The EPA proposal interpreting CERCLA marks the first attempt toward
definitively outlining the exemption for lender liability. Lender Liability,
supra note 134, at 2224. The EPA proposal defines lender liability and the security interest exemption for the first time. Id. Therefore, since the legislature
failed to provide insight addressing CERCLA lender liability, the courts should
adopt the EPA's construction. See PhiladelphiaTelevision, 359 F.2d at 284 (absent legislative history and interpretation, agency statutory construction given
great judicial deference).
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resolves lender liability questions not addressed by both Congress
and the judiciary. Consistent with CERCLA's purpose, the EPA
proposal enumerates lender procedures that both reduce environmental waste and protect cautious lenders against CERCLA liability. In addition, future courts must grant the EPA proposal great
deference. This comment strongly advocates the EPA proposal as a
resolution to fill CERCLA's definitional gaps and to guide both the
courts and lenders.
Bradley S. Fenner

